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October, 1969

THE CRESSET
a review of literature, the arts, and

public affairs

In Luce Tua
Essays on Current Issues by the Editor

California or Bust/
America: Love It Or Leave It
America: Change It Or Lose It
Boycott Grapes
Eat Grapes: The Forbidden Fruit
Legalize Pot
My Bumper Loves Your Bumper
Revolution!
Evolution!
By Any Means Necessary
Sod Brother
Federal Aid, Hell! It's Our Money
Remember The Pueblo
Remember 'We, The People'
Happiness Is A New Govemor
Would You Buy A Used War From This Man?
Save Our Bay
The Czechs Registered Their Guns
Remember Czechago
Keep Eldridge Free
Support Your Local Police
Free Huey
Left Is A Four-Letter Word
Fascism: The Power Of Finance Capital
We Support Our Boys in Vietnam
If I Stop, Can You?
Love
We took these readings on our present situation
as a people from the bumper stickers on the cars cataracting across the San Francisco Bay Bridge this morning and evening. We are now arranging them for reflection from our notes jotted on our litter bag, road
map, and several stray toll ticket receipts. For we are
now on what we are laughingly calling our summer
vacation, traveling far away from our books, mail,
joumals, newspapers, and our study desk and chair
altogether. However, since we must take our new voOctober 1969

cation on vacation, we must perforce do our reading
where we find it on the road and our writing where
we can when stopping.
We are on the road and stopping mostly in Califomia, chiefly in San Francisco, briefly in Los Angeles,
and at several inland points quivering along the San
Andreas fault. Much of Califomia is another country to a Midwestemer. Indeed, much of it is another
country to our country as a whole. Califomia serves
famously, in the terms of Marshall McLuhan, as a
counter-environment and anti-environment. It is
a horizon against which one can see what America
as a whole is all about. And it is in itself an early warning or promise of the future which is already upon
us. The questions one tums over in his mind here
are whether anything human is on this horizon and
whether this future is inevitable.
Geographically, Califomia first offers men freedom through choices of weather and terrain one finds
widely scattered elsewhere in our country. Quite alone
she can give what all are other states can only offer
together, from the mountains to the ocean and from
the forests to the desert. Her own most populated,
coastal climate strikes us as one of deception for men.
For what is softened and blurred by drought-brown
grasses, fog, smog, sand, sun-bleached pastel buildings, long and low seascapes, and flat skylines against
pink and baby blue skies is the very scenery for a sharp
and jagged, convulsive culture.
Her urban life offers choices ranging widely from
San Francisco, the city that never was a town, to Los
Angeles, the megalopolis that will never be a city,
and urbations in between that might as well be in Indiana, Alabama, or upstate New York.
Califomia politics offers extremes of left and right
in the widest polarization, yet often bumper to bumper and ying to yang. There seems to be here less of
a broad mediating middle than one still finds elsewhere. Part of the reason we believe Hollywood seems
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so pale is because so much of its old hoopla has left
and right gone into the social and political life of California as a whole. Furthermore, we wonder who would
go to the movies in California when the whole state
is perpetually flickering previews of the next attraction. Hollywood now produces motion pictures only
to see them desublimated before they are released.
The true fantasies are all underground.
Demographically, California offers choices of the
races of men in America and all together - black,
brown, red, yellow, and pink. However, we mix metaphors to emphasize the racial tension in the melting
pot at the end of this rainbow. Nowhere else can one
see pink power arousing black power arousing brown
power arousing yellow power arousing red power
arousing retaliating pink power again so clearly. We
must observe that whoever thinks California is a fascist state - by whatever definition - is wrong. But
only as wrong as whoever thinks it has no fascist tendencies.
California people are often simply everyone else
in the forty-nine states, for there is where they have
just come from, mostly the young risking hell to reach
heaven. The young set California in motion in no
particular direction; whether in the junior jet set in
Los Angeles or the panhandling "street people" in
Berkeley; whether among the thousands of teenage
runaways or the "paradise people" on trips on Sundays in Golden Gate or Griffith Parks. Everywhere
in summer are hitchhikers - women and children,
and especially young men, "Easy Riders" and "Midnight Cowboys," picaresque and phallic heroes in
perpetual erection searching for America.

A Rumor of Los Angeles?
Religiously, California is surely our most secularized state. That white stuff atop the Sierra Nevadas,
I was told by a remnant Christian, isn't snow at all
but drifts of baptismal certificates dropped on the
way West. Perhaps a Forest Lawn billboard said California best as we entered Los Angeles: "A Cemetery
For All Faiths."
At the same time, California is surely our most religious state, if we are understood to be speaking much
in the same sense the apostle Paul spoke of the religiousness of the Athenians. Add to the range of American mainline denominationalism the following: two
hundred cults and sects; assorted spoof religions; seri4

ous Far Eastern (In California, of course, the near
Far Eastern) religions; and several Westernized varieties of Zen and Yoga. You now have half the picture.
The other half would include the religions that
varieties of Californians make of drugs, sex, race, youthfulness, nature, surfing, sky-diving, nudism, bodybuilding, motorcycling, sports cars, the entertainment
industry, education, gambling in Nevada, astrology, group therapy, sensitivity training, parapsychology, and politics. One must also take readings and lessons from these and other Wild and Now Testaments
to grasp our religious situation.
Admittedly, about the hardest evidence we were
offered to show us that the Judeo-Christian and Piscean Age is waning was the observation of a slightly high hitchhiker that Roman Catholics no longer
necessarily eat fish on Fridays. But if there should
be a dawning of the Age of Aquarius, the symbol we
should now like to propose for it is a sun rising in
the West. Such a symbol would gather up some of
the reversals in our country as more cultural vitalities are seen moving from West to East instead of East
to West. At least it is now more culturally vital to suspect that "As California goes, so goes the country."
If so, where are we going? The temptation of an
academic, over-thirty, ante-McLuhan man is to say
we are going mad in California and to wish much of
it would simply wash out to sea on an oil slick and
sink. (The trouble with wishes in California, however,
is that you may find them fulfilled, and in southern
California even that one might be managed.) But America is not beginning to go mad in California. That we
do elsewhere as easily at home and abroad. Rather,
what may be upon us all if California is much of our
future is only a new libidinousness; a new social and
psychological flow and mix of images of freedom;
a new capacity and willingness to take in everything
more omniattentively; a new mocking humor and
playfulness; an expanding consciousness and contemplation of the human terror and transformation;
a new love of life that may be above ourselves as we
are if we make it over; and more and more protean
personalities and communities which are yet trustworthy even if they are no longer predictable.
No, we conclude, America is not at the end of its
wits in California. It is only the case that more Americans are out here at the end of our continental frontier seeking new frontiers. They are at the end of their
innocence, rurally inward outlooks, and illusions
about orderly social mobility for us all. Many are wondering how much time there is left in our economic
system and the cohesion of our nation of minorities
and migrants by the bonds and remissions of our religious and patriotic traditions.
All of which and more moves many Californians
toward the most experimental and exploratory living
in our country. They try everything, trivial and profound, in desperation and in hope, raising up novelThe Cresset

ties and arousing the old repressions of them before
any of the rest of us either act or react. As we are now
readying ourselves to go east of Eden, the score here
in that terminal of dreams is about tied between the
old and the new. It is most probably a higher score
for the new than we shall find elsewhere in the country ahead of us and surely a lower one than it needs.

Dictionary of Epithets
Now that the disquieting processes of teaching and
learning are resumed on American college and university campuses, we would offer their faculties and
administrations a short dictionary for a few of the
epithets students will be heaping upon them. While
we predict a cooler academic year that the last one
on our campuses, it will surely only be relatively cooler.
After all, so many of the most heated issues are not
resolved nor yet raised, and our students, whatever
may be their innocence of civility, are not stupid.
We could devoutly wish that all parties to the issues would discern them and simply let their "yeas
be yeas and nays be nays." Words on the campus in
conflict, however, are not yet the words we could wish
they were any more than the world is yet the world
we could wish it were. Therefore, we offer this short
dictionary of epithets for those teachers and administrators who will hear and overhear, but not bear, verbal abuse in order to get at the issues.
Take, for example, a few of the obscenities. Suppose you are encouraged to have the most inconceivable carnal relations with yourself or are accused of
having committed the unspeakable Oedipal crime.
First, note the obvious. Sexual perversion is not the
weight of the invitation or allegation. To be sure, these
epithets hotly contend that your relations are improper
-but not sexual relations with yourself or your mother.
That, of course, would be language of degradation,
impure and simple.
These epithets, however, are now principally political terms. They are reserved for administrators whose
relations are adjudged improper with aged absentee trustees, racist parents and patrons, endowments
and campus expansions exploiting the poor, the selective service system, ROTC, warfare research, and
the budget and admission priorities of their own institutions. These epithets are aroused only by the really
obscene ~ administrators who are prostituting AmeriOctober 1969

can colleges and universities by uncritically servicing
every other institution in society only as each wishes to be serviced and pays to be serviced.
These epithets are also used for members of the
faculty. They fall chiefly on teachers whose relations
with their own disciplines are introverted; whose relations with other disciplines are cross-sterilized; and
whose relations with students as educators are nonexistent.
Then, for another example, there are the vulgarities. The chief student vulgarity seems to be unimaginatively excremental, unspecified, or of bulls and
chickens. In the bull case, the meaning of the epithet
is identical with what teachers and administrators
themselves mean when they rise on a "Point of Order" or judge any part of an argument to be "immaterial, irrelevant, or inadmissable evidence." In short,
this epithet means that what you are saying at best
ill attends the issue and at worst is dishonest. Generally note here that students tend to be physical about
the intellectual and you tend to be intellectual about
the physical.
In the chicken case, the meaning of the epithet is
nearly continuous with what a teacher or administrator might remember it meant in the navy, his fraternity, or while working his way through college
long ago as, say, a day-laborer or longshoreman. It
means, of course, that you are lacking courage. However, since this epithet is now used by middle-class,
leisured and idealistic youth, not simply physical
courage is meant. This epithet is used for teachers
and administrators who lack moral courage.
It is reserved for those who use the campus as sanctuary from the suffering of humanity, misplace their
academic suspension of judgment onto questions of
right and wrong, and yield in unseemly haste to the
reprisals and enticements of other institutions in society who use educational institutions toward dubious
ends. Interestingly, this epithet is as often used for
faculty who will not oppose students when they are
in the wrong as much as it is used for faculty who will
not support them when they may be in the right. It
is especially used for him who will not decide.
One other animal in the bestiary of student epithets
is worth translating. That is the pig. Originally, this
epithet was used for FBI agents, policemen, and National Guardsmen who infiltrated student organizations or were called in to repress campus protests with
what seemed to the students to be brutish and sadistic force. The pig was generally one who did spying
or mindless head-knocking for repressive policy-makers
for pay. Until recently, most students were innocent
of the fact that this epithet worked against them as
a racist term when it was used by middle class students
for lower class workers. Now this epithet is used more
and more for those faculty and administrators who
yet carry out policies that they can be expected to understand and disagree with on moral grounds.
5

Grassy Glossa/alia
For a last example, there are the epithets derived
from the drug and hip subcultures of students - epithets used by students who use drugs or not, who are
hip or not. These epithets are vaguer, more multivalent, and gentler, befitting their origins we suppose.
Teachers and administrators seem susceptible only
to a few of them. If they are alleged to be uptight or
hung-up, it means superficially that they appear nervous and suspicious or more deeply that they appear
anal, ingrown, and fixated. Epithets, of course, like
drugs, blind their users to many realities even as they
penetrate other realities. In this case, many students
are blinded to men and women who happen to have
convictions and a sense of vocation. Note that students

have lived too little to have suffered long for their
convictions and are generally unaware that some bags
are not disposable.
These psychedelic epithets, like college catalogs
and hallucinations, are subject to change without notice. The ones currently passing for teachers and administrators seem to be bummer, cop-out, and egotrip. A bummer is a teacher who deflates hope, who
perpetually nay says, and is only so old to know everything that will not work and thereby believes himself wise and realistic. A cop-out is one who evades
issues, or dissolves them in world history and long
views, or perpetually makes referrals out of students
and their problems.
The teacher or administrator who is on an ego-trip
is one with eyes only for himself. He seeks the advan-

See-ing

A

Lltany

This is August, contrary to the date on the cover.
Early August at that. And this is Paris, not Denver
or St. Louis or Valparaiso.
The river down there is the gentle Seine, with a
heavy black barge drifting by. This is the Left Bank.
The American Library is over here, almost under
the Eiffel Tower. It is full of American books and magazines, and I need to read about America after a year's
absence. What I have been learning, sampling recent
magazines, is that American university professors
are disgruntled and pooped. Last year was a trying
one for the academy.
It's the wretched students, of course. Revolutionary and violent, or else well-meaning idealists tragically duped by radicals. Shallow and unlettered or
else dogmatic and four-lettered. Utopian, Marcusian,
Guevaran, stoned, arrogant, vagrant, barefoot, and
fragrant. It is quite a situation to come home to.
What shall I do when I get back, and what shall I
say?
What I really want to do is carry on as usual: conduct a couple of relatively rational courses, work in
my office with the door wide open, stop in at the coffeehouse and listen to the folk singing, go to hear lectures concerning current issues that bother me, go
home and forget about them, eat lunch in the university cafeteria, and transfer some books from the shelves
of the library to the shelves of my office.
But students are everywhere, and all the evidence
points to a year of confrontation.
6
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You represent Authority over me and Judgment
upon me - what are your moral credentials for this
role? Where do you stand? On black enrollment, defense contracts; police conduct, violence, Marx and
Cleaver, soul music and rock, the military-industrial complex, censorship of films and books, sexual freedom, marijuana, concrete poetry, Jean-Luc Godard,
Easy Rider.
Your degrees mean nothing to me. You are a human being like me. Show me how you reach your opinions, and show me if you have any feelings. Whether spoken or silent, from the majority or the few, this
seems to be the challenge.

What to do? Profess the eternal verities and hope
the immediacies take care of themselves? Play off the
rebels against the docile and stand aside, as Thoreau
watched a battle to the death between red ants and
black?
Try to be father, uncle, guru, analyst, pundit, fountain of wisdom, and benevolent slasher of Gordian
knots? Be conspirator and confidant, endorsing every
iconoclastic opinion with a whisper while carefully
declining public commitment?
Stand up for Society and Order, defending all the
diabolisms as well as the respectable traditions of Congress, White House, executive suite, academia, ecclesia, parent, and clan, because the rebellious younger generation needs to see the other side?
I am resolved what to do:
The Cresset

tage of his discipline or department or the aggrandizement of his office or institution at the expense of justice and the whole truth. At bottom, of course, he seeks
only his own reflection, and the university is his means
to that end. If doctors of philosophy were literally
"teachers" who "love wisdom," he would need to return his degree . He may even appear to students to
be advertizing himself more sophomorically than
sophomores, so enraptured is he with himself and
his little learning.
A full glossary of terms for reading campus conflicts would, of course, include translations of more
student epithets than these examples and lead us into
other issues. It would also need to include epithets
teachers and administrators heap upon students. As

the classics faculty knew before the students struck
the phrase, the root meaning of epithet is put-on. The
whole faculty by longer experience has more of the
worst in our whole cultural tradition available to itself to put-on its less experienced students. We have
observed that teachers and administrators can be far
more damaging in what they can mean in their epithets than students can be in what they mean in their
epithets.
Our one and only word for all in the midst of the
coming campus conflicts is still love. It is, we admit,
a four-letter, earthy, psychedelic word. It is also a
deed. We hope love is told and heard and done and
seen this year when so much will be required of its
reality.

By CHARLES VANDERSEE

and

other

Exasperations

0 Lord, if this will not be one of those ordinary Octobers when we
all settle into the new year and go quietly to our books and ritual activities. give me a portion of Your divine patience. which. like the rest of
You, surpasses all human understanding.
Give me patience with rude interruptions, in case the voices are those
of prophecy;
Patience with ignorance, for I may be perceiving it as in a mirror;
and patience with foolishness, for this is not the special province of
youth, nor is it always harmful;
Patience with radicals, for "radical" means root, and if these are the
roots of trees less worm-ridden than the ones we have now, then more
power to them;
Patience with the unamused, for if new trees are being planted we
will need diligent gardeners, and if old one come down, lots of people
will have to cart away the bark and branches;
Patience with faculty colleagues and administrators, even if they
seem blind and insensiti~e, because it is easier for me to cn·ticize from a
distance than for them to make wise decisions under pressures from
students, trustees, taxpayers, parents, reporters, cameramen, politicians, and maybe badgering wives.
But give patience in moderation, 0 Lord, for patience unduly prolonged becomes irresponsible idleness, and patience in the face of unfairness and unnecessary pain is nothing other than complicity.
Therefore give me also Wisdom, 0 Lord, not the serene wisdom of a
detached philosopher who knows the world too well to act or hope or
care; but rather the wisdom to watch closely and to discern whatever
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whispers of truth may lie among the loud tirades and distortions and
rumors and third-hand reports.
Give me the wisdom to shut up and stay shut up when I do not know
what is going on; and the wisdom to say Yes, No, or Maybe, at the right
times and in the right places, and to disregard bandwagons, fashions,
and martyred stances as I make up my mind.
If I must speak, 0 Lord, give me words that cannot be misunderstood, and place the resonance of love within my voice.
And, dear Lord, since all of the above sounds like an exercise in
self-congratulatory pomposity, you had better shower down upon me
the rain of humility, piercing holes in my umbrella of self-satisfaction
with the hail of correction and sudden revelation. For my resistance
to You is strong.
Send to all of us a sense of humor and a spirit of objectivity, for a
thousand ages in Your sight are but iiSQU,:J;izlf hour on the moon, and
even now, 0 Lord, the autumn trees will be turning in Paris. Send to
them, along the boulevards and river, tounsts worthy of them, preserve
them from traffic fumes, and spare them from conscription once again
as barricades in street battles. In hours of crisis let them rise to our
minds as images of distant beauty.
P.S. A special blessing, 0 Lord, upon Andre Malraux for sandblasting Notre Dame and. the Louvre and the other great building of Paris.
The noise is ferocious and the scaffolding looks terrible, but the result
is worth it. If sandblasting is what we are hearing and seeing on our
campuses these days, give us a persisting vision of the sparkling results.
Amen.
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The Bruised Body
By WARREN KLIEWER

Department of English
Wichita State University
Wichita, Kansas

In the early part of this century an Irish poet and
playwright, William Butler Yeats, sailed to Byzantium
because he realized that
An aged man is but a paltry thing,
A tattered coat upon a stick, unless
Soul clap its hands and sing, and louder sing.
Once in Byzantium - that is, "out of nature" ..:.._he would
never take his "bodily form from any natural thing."
In order to take a prophetic stance, the poem seems to
say, one must begin in the body and move out into the
region of the soul.
In 1923 a company of prophets, the Moscow Art Theatre, set sail from Byzantium and brought almost the
same message to the United States. Like many other
prophets before him, Constantin Stanislavski followed
his first charismatic preaching by publishing a fable,
My LJfe In Art, in 1924. Both the acting and the book
seemed to say that unless soul clap its hands and sing,
acting is but a paltry thing. After the fable came the
commentaries, still prophetic and still in mythical form:
An Actor Prepares in 1936, Building A Character in
1949, and Creating A Role in 1961. And of course commentaries were written about the commentaries: Richard Boleslavsky's Acting: The First Six Lessons, for
example. Schools were formed with the intensity of a
disciple's devotion to his master. New doctrines based
on the prophet's vision were devised, and this led to
schisms, rival bishops, anti-popes. A rebellious Reformation emanated from Augsburg, the birthplace of Bertolt Brecht. And we have witnessed a heresy trial or two.
In a biographical sketch, "Lee Strasberg: Burning Ice,"
(Tulane Drama Review 26, 131-154) the inquisition acts
swiftly - passing judgment, carrying out the sentence,
displaying the ashes, and publishing the court proceedings.
This prophet imagery is not just tomfoolery. It is not
hard to find similarities between Stanislavski's methods
and the various spiritual disciplines of the Russian Orthodox Church. An actor, for example, needs to spend
long periods before each performance, building his
concentration and awareness of the character. This is
not unlike the long preparation ritual for each Orthodox priest who is about to perform the liturgy or the
different but still very arduous regime of prayer and
fasting for each worshipper planning to receive the
Eucharist. Similarly, Tortsov in An Actor Prepares
teaches his students how to have "self-communion",
this in a culture with a long tradition of mystics and hermits who had pursued the same end. I doubt that these
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similarities were coincidences, if for no other reason
than that, whether one uses theological language or not,
the forms of one's thought are influenced by the popular pieties one encounters.
But as a matter of fact Stanislavski did use theological
language, much to the annoyance of nertolt Brecht,
who listed some of the offensive words in a note, "The
Treacherous Vocabulary."
A character should be "creative." The creator is
God.
Art is "sacred." The actor is to "serve." Whom? Art.
The actor "transforms himself," just as in the Mass
the bread is transformed into the Body of Christ.

Concentration is the "withdrawal into the self" of
the mystic.
The imagined fourth wall permits the actor to be
"alone" with his God, Art.
And so on. Finally at the end of the list, appearing all
alone and without comment, as if its self-evident offensiveness deserved no comment, is the phrase:
"The soul"
We could write off this quibble as one of the dangers of
being a prophet, who is not to be understood outside
his own culture.
But as a matter of fact, Stanislavski did create some
very serious problems with the vagueness of his language, and these have distorted his conclusions. One of
the troublesome words is "nature." Another is, as Brecht
pointed out, the "soul." Third - and this may be either
a result or a symptom - Stanislavski found it hard to
define the relationship between the "soul" and the body.
I should like to attempt an analysis of the connotations
of these words, not pretending that verbal analysis will
solve all the problems, but suggesting only that it will
point the way toward solutions.
First, "nature" - a term that has been very slippery
in the history of ideas and that Stanislavski did nothing
to clarify. One of its most prominent associations is with
creativity. For Stanislavski, nature is not creation but
creator. In the impassioned peroration of Building A
Character, he calls nature "the greatest artist we know,"
and distinguishes it from the mind, the emotions, even
the Muses. Where is nature located? Or in his words:
"Where does she live?" He doesn't say. Is he talking
about something real? We haven't time to ask, for the
The Cresset

argument rushes to the climax: "There was nothing for
me to do except to devote my labors and energy almost
exclusively to the study of Creative Nature." (pp. 287-9)
The terms are now capitalized.
The notion of nature as creator recurs in the other
books. An Actor Prepares concludes with:
You can go astray only if you do not understand
that truth; if you do not have confidence in nature; if
you try to think up "new principles," "new bases,"
"new art." Nature's laws are binding on all, without
exception, and woe to those who break them. (p. 295)
The actor, it seems, is not entirely in control of his art.
The secrets of inspiration and the inscrutable ways
to approach it are known only to nature. Only nature
can perform the miracle without which the text of a
role remains lifeless and inert. In short, nature is the
only creator in the world that has the capacity to bring
forth life. (Creating A Role, p . 82)
And of course this same mood surrounds the references
to nature in the earliest book, My Life In Art. If we
could assume that the language accurately describes
Stanislavski's feelings, we would conclude that he was
smitten with awe when contemplating nature as a free
creative force, and that nature became almost an object
of worship, a spirit which graciously chooses from time
to time to become incarnate in a humble actor. Indeed,
the claims made for the creative powers of nature become almost absurd.
Letters, syllables, words were not invented by man,
they were suggested to him by his instincts, impulses,
by nature herself, time and place. (Building, p. 83)
If nature can do all this, why should an actor go through
rigorous training? Simply to make the body and voice
capable of exercising their "naturally predestined functions." (Building, p . 90)
The passage quoted earlier from An Actor Prepares
suggests another connotation. Nature has "laws" and it
punishes those "who break them." Nature, then, is a
moral as well as a creative force. The punishment, according to a passage in My Life In Art, is bad theatre:
"Instead of naked passion there was a bad conventionality, instead of art there was trade. Nature always avenges the violation and the breaking of her laws." (p. 476)
It is worth noticing exactly where he places the emphasis, not on something physical but on a spiritual quality.
He doesn't mean that unnatural acting will harm the
vocal mechanism, for example. Rather, the connotations
imply that breaking the laws of nature is punished by
conventional art. Conventional theatre, as we are told
repeatedly, is untruthful theatre. A violation of nature,
therefore, results in spiritual damage.

Stanislavskian Soul
A creative force, a moral law with a system of punishments, a force associated with truth, all of which are
good things: these are the attributes connoted by his
use of "nature." We would conclude, then, that nature
October 1969

is also a good thing, if we didn't already know that. But
we already did know that, for appeals to "follow Nature"
are part of the stock in trade of the history of ideas.
Plato followed nature; so did Aristotle; so did Rousseau, Wordsworth, and Shakespeare; so does Hugh Hefner. And they all have contradictory conclusions. What
is new is that Stanislavski develops the appeal to nature
in a way one would not have thought possible in the
theatre. For example, the connotations of his use of
"nature" usually do not include the body. Is an actor's
body therefore a bad thing? The emotional appeals
would suggest this. Nor are other material things good.
"We are not concerned with the actual naturalistic existence of what surrounds us on the stage, the reality of the
material world! This is of use to us only in so far as it
supplies a general background for our feelings" (Actor,
p. 122) - feelings, that is, which participate in the cosmic creative force of nature. Of course, Stanislavski
did not actually operate on the conclusions which his
language would suggest. He spent a great deal of time
and energy working out the details of his set designs; he
spent years working on voice and movement. In many
ways his practice was a fortunate contradiction of his
theory. It is by no means clear, then, that Stanislavski
really believed what his language suggests: it may be
only that the emphases of the connotations were intended as an argument against prevailing theatre practices. At any rate, the language seems to depict "nature"
almost mystically, a spiritual entity, a good cosmic force
as opposed to less important material entities.
His use of the word "soul" implies the same, and the
two words are very closely related to each other. An insight which he had discovered by the end of My Life
In Art was that
Besides talent, an inner spiritual technique is necessary; without it one cannot find true psychological
and physiological approaches to the soul of man for
the natural and conscious birth of a superconscious
creative impulse in it. (p. 475)
Exactly what this passage means is a little hard to say.
But if one cuts through the high-sounding language,
it would seem that Stanislavski is talking about the actor's means of finding a way to base his art on something
more enduring and truthful that convention. The actor
uses techniques designed to "approach" the soul. Notice
that the actor does not "free" the soul or "improve" it
or "save" it or "make it whole." He simply finds it, and
having done so, presumably allows it to give birth in a
"natural" way to creative powers. This is consistent with
the way "soul" is used throughout the books.
There are three important inferences to be drawn
from the connotations of this language. The first is that
the soul, like nature, is something given. One does not
create a soul; one creates from the basis of a soul. The
soul is the origin of all good things in creative work.
Thus, Stanislavski speaks of the "depths, where the spiritual life of a role begins, to create which is the main objective of our art." (Creating, p. 154) A second inference
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comes from the use of the word "soul" almost interchangeably with "nature." The "soul" is one's individual nature,
one's personality. It is apparently that small part of the
cosmic creative and moral force which resides within
one but which still retains its connections with the cosmic force. In the work on Othello he advises the actors
to "draw more and more on your own nature." (Creating,
p. 204) In another passage, interesting for its extraordinary ambiguity, he makes the connection between
nature and the soul explicit.
How to plum the depths of a role, an actor, or an audience? It can only be done with the aid of nature. The
keys to the secret places of the creative superconscious
are given over to the nature of the actor as a human
being. (Creating, p. 82)
The ambiguity retains the connection between "soul,"
"your own nature," and "nature" in the larger sense.
From this there follows a third inference, not of course
by virtue of logic but by the power of connotation: the
soul justifies the body. The body may not be good in
itself but can be made good by the kind of work the soul
does under the surface. Stanislavski even goes so far as
to suggest that this hidden soul-work is the whole point
of the theatre. After referring to the "public's sense of
the inner life of the character," he asserts that "It is for
this that plays are written and theatre exists." (Building, p. 274) The theatre is not for the purpose of displaying bodies but of revealing souls. He describes the
relationship more precisely when he says that a movement exercise was truthful "when it was justified by an
inner impulse." (Building, 0.66) How is the actor justified ? By faith , of course, not by works :
Put life into all the imagined circumstances and actions
until you have completely satisfied your sense of truth,
and until you have awakened a sense of faith in the
reality of your sensations. This process is what we
call justification of a part. (Actor, p. 122)

Mysticism and the Method
This hidden evaluation of the soul is alarming, I
think - and the more hidden, the more alarming. There
are times when he is more careful and seems to make an
effort to overcome the subtle prejudice in favor of soul.
Thus, "In every physical act there is a psychological
element and a physical one in every psychological act."
(Actor , p. 132) Or, "there is complete union between
the physical and the spiritual being of a role. " (Creating, PP. 208f.) But much of the time his guard is down,
and the prejudice is clear. It operates even in metaphors. The words of a play (i.e., the body) are not important : "The point is not the words. The line of a role is
taken from the subtext, not from the text itself." (Creating, p . 139) Both the metaphor and the prejudice are
explicit in one of the transitions :
Now that you have created the body of the role, we
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can begin to think about the next, even more important, step, which is the creation of the human soul
in the part. (Actor, p. 136)
Words are discussed in terms of the body-soul conflict :
"These are not empty vowels; they have a spiritual content." (Building, p. 84) In a good performance, he says,
the spiritual well springs, the inner essence is released - the real things which inspired the writing
of the play, the poem, the score of music .. . Only in a
performance can we feel the true spirit... " (Building, pp. 109f., emphasis mine)
Even the intellect, we discover, is part of the corrupted
body: "Now the process goes deeper." (And going "deeper," as we all know, is a good thing.) "It goes down from the
realm of the external, the intellectual, into that of the inner, spiritual life." (Creating, p. 25)
In short, Stanislavski's ambiguous language seems
to set up a metaphysic and a value system. There is a
great creative and moral force called nature, which installs itself in the bodies of people and things. These
installed bits are souls. Apparently this force has little
interest in the bodies surrounding the souls. Bodies
are only the corruptible shells of the kernels of ultimate
reality. Therefore, the art of acting is a spiritual discipline: the motto, you remember, was "Through conscious technique to the subconscious creation of artistic
truth." (Building, p.266)
As I suggested earlier, we cannot be entirely sure that
the connotations of the language represent Stanislavski's
deepest beliefs. It is possible that they do. If so, they
create a very serious critical question to those of us who
want to adopt Stanislavski's techniques: is it possible to
use the methods unless we also embrace the semi-mystical piety that lies behind it? The pious notions of "nature" and "soul" are part of the basis of the method :
how much of the method is transferable to another value
system, another theology?
It is possible, however, that the connotations do not
represent Stanislavski's considered opinions. As a matter
of fact, he often tried to promulgate just the opposite:
that an actor's body is extremely important, that line
readings must be carefully controlled, that one must be
very exact with set designs, and that a method of teaching actors must be based on empirical observation. The
problem then is that the unexamined connotations of
his terms lead us to quite different conclusions. My only
real objection so far is that these connotations were unexamined.
Unexamined, that is, until late in his life. As he continued to observe and to rethink his theories, he placed
less and less emphasis on the primacy of the soul. But
it was not until the writing of Part III of Creating A Role
that he came close to making the body and soul equal in
importance. To be sure, there are still remnants of an
older way of thinking: creating the unbroken line of
physical actions, he says, "is only half (and not the more
important half) of the life of a role. " (p. 227) But still
he made it clear that he had discovered a "new secret
The Cresset

and new quality," the "method of physical action." This
new method rested on a rather simple shift in evaluation.
The bond between the body and soul is indivisible.
The life of the one engenders the life of the other,
either way around ... They are intertwined. A common
purpose brings them closer together and reinforces
the unbreakable bond between them. (pp. 227f.)
If I may, I should like to invoke Yeats again, who put
the new insight succinctly in "Among School Children":
Labour is blossoming or dancing where
The body is not bruised to pleasure soul. ..
From this small change in evaluation, two very important consequences can be derived. First, it is possible to
reverse the direction in which an actor works. The earlier manuals had insisted that inner states were the
"sources of action." (Actor, p. 193) Believability was
"justified by an inner impulse." (Building, p. 66) "Scenic
action," like the spiritual technique , "is the movement
from the soul to the body, from the center to the periphery, from the internal to the external, from the thing
an actor feels to its physical form" (Creating, p. 49. It
should be noted that this first portion of the book was
written very early, ca. 1916-20.) But now all that could be
reversed; the body could lead the soul. "The simplest
physical action when executed by an actor on the stage
obliges him to create, in accordance with his own
impulses, all sorts of imaginary fictions, proposed circumstances, and 'ifs."' (p. 239) At the end of the book
Stanislavski becomes more emphatic: "when you execute physical actions analogous to your part . .. then and
only then can you understand and feel the pulsing life
of your character and do it with your own whole being."
(p. 247, emphasis mine) This change, which Stanislavski
kept insisting was a new method, is clarified in an interview with Robert Lewis in the Stanislavski issues of
Tulane Drama Review. The questioner remarks:
When he was doing Tartuffe in 1937 he would get the
actor on the stage at the very beginning with props
and movement... The environment was there and the
actor had to move in it right from the beginning.
And Lewis explains the significance of this technique:
He was beginning at the end of his life to realize that
it may be true that if we are timid, we knock on the
door in a certain way, and also true that if we knock
on the door in a certain light manner, it creates in us
a sense of timidity . .. How a person behaved and
moved fed whatever inner impulse he had. (TDR 26,

p. 104)

The Resurrection of the Body
A subtler consequence of the "new physical method of
action" was a new attitude toward the actor's consciousness of himself. Earlier, Stanislavski had insisted that
an actor must be aware of the character's feelings and
conscious of his objectives. Now, however, it became
possible, even advantageous, to make the physical actions
October 1969

the object of concentration. Stanislavski had come to
understand a more complex process of releasing the
creative powers of the soul by diverting attention to the
body, a process which he could not have understood
without first trusting in the unity of the two. His comments on this new insight are worth quoting.
As you are drawn to physical actions you are drawn
away from the life of your subconscious. In that way
you render it free to act and induce it to work creatively. This action of nature and its subconscious is
so subtle and profound that the person who is doing
the creating is unaware of it.
It is not within the range of human consciousness
to carry out this occult work, and so what is beyond
our powers is done in our stead by nature itself. And
what induces nature to do this work? My method of
creating the life of the physical being of a part. My
method draws into action by normal and natural
means the subtlest creative forces of nature which are
not subject to calculation. This is a new quality, and
I wish to stress it. (pp. 240f.)
Now, the idea of nature has not really changed, hut its
relationship to the body has. The body now also does
nature's work. No longer an effect of soul-work, physical action is also a cause. This change of attitude, this
willing acceptance of the physical, is progress of a very
significant kind, it seems to me.
But even though the prospects of this new kind of
theory are exciting, we can still question whether the
"new physical method" went far enough. Stanislavski
had progressed only as far as Yeats did in having one
of his characters, Crazy Jane, say:
But Love has pitched his mansion in
The place of excrement.
This is still only a forced, jarring, embarrassed celebration of the body.
Suppose, however, that instead of borrowing the concepts of a semi-mystical, romanticized Platonism, Stanislavski had begun with a different theology. Suppose
that instead of pursuing universals - the "most pure,
immortal, life-giving and appalling mysteries," to use
the words of the Orthodox liturgy - he had concerned
himself with the particularities of nature in his theory
as well as in his practice. Suppose that he had begun
with an understanding of "the choice of the particular
to manifest universal truth," to use the words of Claude
Tresmontant's Essai Sur La Pensee Biblique:
God has chosen a particular people among the nations
to manifest the truth. To do this He called a particular man who is named Abraham, at one particular
time and in one limited place. The Incarnation is
the choice of the particular, of the real with all its
historical and geographic contingencies; a particular
woman, a particular epoch, a particular with all its
sociological contingencies. God Himself becomes
someone particular for us, concrete, an individual
with his name, country, his face, his history. The
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choice of the particular to manifest universal truth, to
teach the truth which by right is universal, is without
doubt the most profound intellectual scandal, the
scandal par excellence for the Hellenic intelligence ...
This method - which is the method of the Incamation - contradicts the profound dualism congenital to our thought. (Quoted in William F. Lynch, S.J.,
Christ And Apollo, Supplement II)
This is the same theme running through Erich Auerbach's monumental work, Mimesis, where the author
speaks of "the sublime influence of God" reaching "so
deeply into the everyday that the two realms of the sublime and the everyday are not only actually unseparated but basically inseparable." (p. 19) It is like John

Donne's profound understanding of what it means to
assert that the soul is incamate in the flesh:
So, to one neutral thing both sexes fit.
We die and rise the same, and prove
Mysterious by this lovein language so ambiguous that we cannot tell whether
he is talking about flesh or spirit. And it doesn't matter,
for they are both the same. This incarnational theology
has direct relevance to the theatre, where there is no
spirit separable from the bodies on the stage and in the
orchestra. Stanislavski's "method of physical action"
moves in this direction. It would not have been inconsistent with his "new secret" to follow the direction to
its conclusion, the identification of "soul" and "body."

Toward a Re-evaluation of Tragedy
By CHARLES W. SCHAEFER
Division of English
Rockville Center South Side High School
New York

The Art Form
An assumption which often underlies our ideas
about art forms is that the art form must mirror life.
But this is merely the beginning of art's objectives.
Like all art, tragedy is based on real life, using people, places, things, and situations, but it is a mistake
to hold tragedy to the simple function of depicting
observed reality. Art often does more than depict
life; it draws attention to "other sides" of reality, those
truths which ordinarily evade perception by the average, and even above average, man. Art presupposes
the narrowly limited awareness of the populace, inflicted by everyday living, and often bespeaks the
enormity, perhaps the complexity, at times the beauty, of the inward and outward creation. This is the
revelatory function of art.
But the tradition of art is not merely to reveal, but
also to interpret. It is inconceivable, therefore, for
art to assert total absurdity as the substance of human
existence, for art presupposes its own intelligibility as a medium of expression. Total absurdity cancels the idea of the logos, and therein contradicts the
significance of the artistic impulse. Partial absurdity,
on the other hand, is a tenable possibility for the conclusions of art, especially for tragedy. Tragedy may
show that a certain principle or attitude or act is ab-
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surd; and, implicit in such an interpretation is the
suggestion of the "why" of its absurdity. It is at this
point that we inescapably confront the ethical nature
of tragedy, and perhaps of art in general. Tragedy,
with its juxtaposition of order and disorder, fortune
and misfortune, success and failure, and life and death,
- indeed, meaning and meaninglessness, - is inescapably didactic. It is a,pity that that word has taken
a pejorative course in modern times; such a fact might
itself be didactic of the state of modem man, a state
which causes him to laugh at instruction, holding
himself above it. In any event, we cannot avoid the
logical imperative that where two or more persons
or selves are forced to encounter each other, there
the ethical question may be said to obtain.
A distinction must be made at this point, however,
between mere didacticism and art. Didacticism in
its most elemental form is manifested in lectures, sermons, laws, codes, scriptures, and the like. But art
is less simply didactic, because it is concemed as much
with its style as with its ethic, as much with the achievement of a convincing form as with the achievement
of a convincing argument. In fine, the two, in art, are
inseparable, the claims of the recent "Art is style" cult
notwithstanding.
As an art form, then, tragedy cannot be said to be
solely concemed with telling a real story realistically.
The Cresset
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Moreover, we are further prevented from seeking
a purely social significance in tragedy, although it
can be said partly to mirror social dilemmas or social upheaval. Tragedy has reference to human existence, but simultaneously it has reference to unexplored and eclipsed areas of human existence, as suggested earlier. Merely to construct a drama around
an historical or fictitious human event and to unfold
the plot devoid of any revelation of eclipsed facts usually given no heed in ordinary life is not to construct
a tragedy, however pathetic the outcome. The manner in which a true tragedy calls attention to these
eclipsed facts is a function of style and is left to the
method of the tragedian.
Within this framework, for example, the crucial
fact to which Hamlet calls attention is that man is sometimes called upon to perform a deed of ultimate significance and ultimate danger, without being given
the commensurate instrumentation and opportunity. This has been a fact of many men's lives, a fact which
most often remains hidden from our perception, but
a fact which Shakespeare faced and would have us
face. More simply, it is the fact of human inadequacy.
Why else would Hamlet cry,
The time is out of joint. 0 cursed spite
That ever I was born to set it right !1
The fact to which Oedipus calls attention, a fact which
in all its implications may be termed horrible, is that
man is capable of performing atrocities unconsciously,
but not the less responsibly:
My soul broods over its cares and renews its fears.
That by my crime Laius fell, gods both of heaven
and hell affirm; and yet my soul, conscious of
innocence and known to itself better than to the
gods makes denial. 2
In Riders to the Sea, for a modern example, the truth
revealed is the paradox that the source of life is often
the source of death for man, without, of course, his
knowledge. In this play by Synge the sea is both the
matrix and the murderer of men, themselves unable to
detect such a pattern of life and death. But the women
detect it, and are powerless to restrain the men from
the sea:
Maurya:

Isn't it a hard and cruel man who
won't hear a word from an old
woman, and she holding him
from the sea?
Bartley:
I must go now quickly. I'll ride
down on the red mare, and the
gray pony'll run behind me. . . .
The blessing of God on you.
The function of calling attention to what I have
called eclipsed truths of human existence is not, of
course, solely within the province of tragedy. The
novel, in certain isolated cases, has done quite as good
a job of it, as have other types. But the dramatic element
which tragedy entails - that immeasurably effective
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phenomenon of spectator involvement - reinforces
the revelatory function of tragic drama in a way that
no other genre can boast of.

The Tradition
The next most obvious fact about tragedy, after its
being of the essence of art and itself an art form, is that
it is not without a tradition, a tradition which can be
traced almost as far into the past as the beginnings of
recorded history. To ignore this consideration is very
possibly to draw incongruous conclusions about the
nature of tragedy. We must assume that certain "strands"
of the tradition of tragedy are crucial, and a complete
avoidance of them by any tragic-appearing drama must
be viewed as destructive of, or at the least, contradictory
to, the art form itself. A so-called "work" - in our case
a tragedy - which develops outside the scope of its tradition may not entitle itself to any of the claims of that
tradition. A "tragedy" which disregards all the legacies
of the tragic tradition is not tragedy, and there is no
need for critics to find a way to justify it as such by
calling it a mirror of the contemporary scene.
The question as to which vestiges of the tragic tradition are vital and which are not is arguable. But opinions are here given, because they are all that are available.
The two elements of the tragic tradition which, to the
present writer, are absolutely fundamental are protagonist (I will not say hero) and disorder (I will not
say conflict, because conflict may be said to exist in
abundance in comedies). The protagonist has undergone many changes from Prometheus to, say, Willy
Loman, and anyone slightly acquainted with tragic
criticism has heard critics assert the disappearance of
the hero, or trace, like Williams, his course from "hero
to victim."3 In like manner, the disorder which must
erupt in the life of the protagonist has severely mutated
during the course of the development of tragedy. Each
of these two fundamental but extremely variable ingredients presupposes certain stipulations which further delimit its own nature.
The image of the protagonist which has been consistently preserved, be he god or be he salesman, is that
which Williams reserves, erroneously I think, for
modern tragedy: the image of victim. What is more
peculiar about the tragic hero than his being victimized? That characteristic has remained almost absolutely unchanged over the centuries, while classification
as to rank in society, wealth, even sex, has changed
fairly constantly. The fact of his victimization is probably that, more than all else, which accounts for our
being capable of self-identity with the protagonist.
Although it is not requisite to tragedy, bearing Aristotle in mind, the impact of tragedy upon the audience
bears directly upon the esteem in which the work is
held. In this sense of the perpetuation of the art form,
the extent to which the audience is capable of identi-
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fying itself with the protagonist may be seen as a major
factor. And what man or woman of natural disposition
can not see something of himself in the victim of an
unperformable obligation, of a misplaced faith, of belated enlightenment, of impending mortality itself?
Sometimes, it is true, the protagonist is the victim of
himself, but such a situation in the tragic tradition is
never reducible merely to being born, or merely to unprovoked morbidity as has been the attempt of some to
depict, such as Edward Albee in The Zoo Story .
Tragedy is possible in the twentieth century so long
as the protagonist is portrayed as recently-become, or
soon to become, victimized by some force within or
without himself to which, during the whole or' his life
to the time of the dramatic action, he has been either
immune or unaware of. The occasion of the disruption
of his normal mode of life and mental equilibrium must
be a form of intelligible provocation, not some inexplicable prompting in a warped mind.
Fate is an acceptable provocation for tragedy, inscrutable though it often is, but it is an inescapable
fact that fate never operates alone in the tragic tradition; it is inevitably tied to human responsibility. It
is when we fully recognize the element of the fateresponsibility symbiosis in classic tragedy that we salute the glory of the Greek experience. The two are at
once operative, and yet in their tragedies the Greeks
discovered that neither operates independently of the
other.
Friedrich Nietzsche, in propounding his theory that
Greek tragedy was born of the marriage of the Dionysian and Apollonian natures of man,4 proceeded to explain that he had had reference to the unrestrained
and the restrained natures respectively. The tragic
art form, unlike other art forms which partake solely
of the Apollonian dimension of man's nature, represented a unique artistic achievement, for it brought together the agents of chaos and of music, of darkness
and of light, of the frenzied orgy and of sober awe.
What happens, we ask, when these two cosmic polarities are forcefully fused, as they are in tragedy? Do
we have a victory for the god of revelry and wine, or
one for the god of poiesis2 We have victory for both.
Neither god triumphs over the other; neither, moreover, triumphs over man. Instead, each is victorious
because he succeeds in impressing himself upon man's
awareness; each god gains man's recognition.
Nietzsche did not denominate the god Dionysis as
in any way the symbol of fate, or the dread of fate; nor
did he denominate Apollo as the symbol of responsibility. But neither the sense nor the analogue is corrupted in doing so.

Inscrutability and Inexorability
What are the implications for tragedy of what I have
called the fate-responsibility symbiosis? They are pe-
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culiar in all literature, for they plant man within a universe which is teleologically ordered at the same time
that it is utterly inscrutable, and they bind him forever to the eschatology of his acts and to the intents
of his heart at the same time that they imbue him with
free will.
Within this framework man becomes the active and
determining focal point in a non-sentient universe,
for although fate is inscrutable, it unfolds inviolably
in its own cause-effect reaction to man's acts. Tragedy
is Man Acting and standing alone, hushed under his
natural and societal coverings, to behold Creation Reacting.
Tragedy teaches us, in this context, that however
fearsome the unknowable future might appear to be, it
is finally a codified disposition of Man's Self. It further
teaches us the necessary converse of that cosmic Pauline
exhortation, "Be not deceived; God is not mocked: for
whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap"5:
Whatever is reaped has been sown!
Although it is true that tragedy must be seen to be
didactic in order for it to be elevated to its true stature,
the essence of its didacticism is not merely the law of
retribution, but the law that the means to human greatness leads through a state of ultimate acceptance of
responsibility for acts committed. Whether the hero
learns this lesson or not is a matter of great moment;
the audience too, must learn it if tragedy is to survive.
Tragedy teaches us much more. It demonstrates that
while fate must react in an inviolable cause-effect pattern to man's deeds, it has always, by virtue of its dual
nature of inscrutability and inexorability, been a stumbling-block to tragic man. Because he knows it must
unfold - but does not know how it will unfold - tragic
man seduces himself to cancel his consciousness of
responsibility. He thinks he can perhaps coerce the disposition of fate to his own favor by means of an ambivalent life, not knowing that his ambivalent life contains the seeds of a subsequently ambivalent destiny.
The second of the two requisite elements of the tragic
tradition is that of disorder. Disorder of a general,
unintelligible, or unprovoked nature, however, is not
material for the tragic action of tradition. There are,
it seems to me, only two possible bases for tragic disorder, one rooted in immediate causes and one in ultimate causes. The ultimate cause of disorder, i.e., the
refusal of responsibility for the outcome of fate (albeit,
this refusal of responsibility is only temporary, for the
decline of the hero in the greatest of our tragedies
brings about a renewed but belated sense of responsibility), has already been discussed. The immediate
cause of tragic disorder, on the other hand, is the hero's
temptation to put his trust in something other than his
own hitherto invulnerable sense of responsibility for
acts committed, i.e., to put his faith in an order, person, or fact which during the action of the play fails
or deceives him.
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A prime illustration of tragedy's resulting from a
man's having faith in an order which eventually deceives him is the situation of Hippolytus in Racine's
Phaedra. After becoming innocently enmeshed in a
love quadrilateral by learning of his stepmother's incentuous passion for him, he agonizes over the question of whether to expose his stepmother's illicit love
and clear himself, knowing that should he decide to
preserve her reputation, it must be at the peril of his
own fate. Desiring to save her (Phaedra) out of respect,
he informs Aricia, his own true love and confidant, of
his decision to keep Phaedra's incest a secret, remarking,
Let us rely upon the justice of the gods,
For they are much concerned to justify me. 6
A very short time after uttering this statement of faith,
Hippolytus dies a horrible death, precipitat....d by Phaedra's fabrications against him. In fine, the person whom
he pitied, slew him to justify herself, and his faith in
the gods was of no avail. The hierarchy of the Greek
gods, worthy of every Greek's faith and devotion, were
not worthy of the faith of Hippolytus, for he forgot his
first and higher obligation to inscrutable and inexorable
fate. As for the disorder attendant upon his life, it intruded suddenly, after he was appealed to by a person
whose life was lived in contradiction to the ethic of his
own. Accepting responsibility for Phaedra, whose ethic
was completely opposed to his own, he deliberately if ignorantly - abandoned responsibility for his deed~.
and reaped an arbitrary fate.

Tragedy and the "'Two Cultures"
Failure to understand the tragic tradition's aboslutely inviolable commitment to human responsibility is
probably one of the root causes behind the noticeable
paucity - relatively speaking - of tragedy in our
time. Without such an appreciation of tragedy, men
can find very little to justify it either as a worthy literary type or as something worthy of spectator involvement. Such is not only the case with the non-literary,
but in too many instances with critics, scholars, and
playwrights as well. The direction of much modern
drama is toward the absurd, with heavy overtones of
homosexuality, insanity, suicide, psycho-neurosis,
and ultra-sexuality. This has been necessitated by the
denial of responsibility in drama. Without responsibility, tragic man becomes not a victim, for a victim
may persist - as did Prometheus - in defying his
tormentor solely on the strength of his will, but a foredoomed guinea pig, manipulated by a malevolent and
infinitely superior Experimenting Machine. The audience sits and watches, a wryly-smiling inquisitor in the
employ of the Experimenter, while Tragic Man is
brain-washed, programed, stripped, disassembled, desouled, and utterly sacrificed.
The denial of the fate-responsibility symbiosis is also
probably the cause for the brusque manner in which our
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lofty art form has been brushed aside by the progressives, those denizens of the brave new world for whom
means and method represent the highest ends. Typical
of the case in point is the now-famous controversy between C. P. Snow and F. R. Leavis which, during the
early sixties, raged over the question of the significance of the humanities for modern times. C. P . Snow,
spokesman for the scientist and progressive, insisted
repeatedly that humanism, and tragedy in particular,
had been having a debilitating effect on human progress, and that the scientific culture is more likely to
aid man than is the humanistic culture. F. R. Leavis,
professor at Cambridge, came to the defense of humanism
and the humanities with a number of rebuttals, equally brilliantly contrived, no doubt, - but ill directed at one of Snow's most powerful attacks. Snow
suspected that the Western literary tradition, with i(S
emphasis on the tragic condition of man, had engendered a fatalistic attitude, an attitude of passive acceptance of the horrors of human existence. The "other"
culture, the scientific one, is motivated to improve
this life, to elevate it - if only a bit - from its present
tragic state:
Among scientists, deep-natured men know, as starklyasanymenhave known, that the individual human
condition is tragic; for all its triumphs and joys,
the essence of it is loneliness and the end death.
But what they will not admit is that, because the
individual condition is tragic, therefore the social
condition must be tragic, too. Because a man must
die, that is no excuse for his dying before his time
and after a servile life. The impulse behind the
scientists drives them to limit the area of tragedy,
to take nothing as tragic that can conceivably lie
within men's will. They have nothing but contempt
for those representatives of the traditional culture
who use a deep insight into man's fate to obscure
the truth, just to hang on to a few perks. 7
This attitude, it cannot be doubted, is partly justified by the extremes of absurdity and fatalism to which
much modern drama and fiction have stretched themselves. But there is something of scorn in Sir Charles'
implication that the literature of tragedy in general,
unlike the men of science, does not "limit the area of
tragedy," by taking "nothing as tragic that can conceivably lie within men's will." It is not a new argument
that the chief bequest of science to mankind is the
reasonable hope of physical salvation, salvation from
drudgery, pain, hunger, disease, and death. Within
this context any litterateur or metaphysician who insists on nagging the populace into a sense of loss,
whether it be loss of identity, purpose, hope, or humanity, would appear to be not only unfamiliar with the
potentialities of science, but "wise in his own conceit."
Earlier in his "Two Cultures" Snow directs his attack
with sharper focus: "They (contemporary scientists)
regard it as a major intellectual virtue, to know what
not to think about. They might touch their hats to
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linguistic analysis, as a relatively honourable way of
wasting time; not so to existentialism."8 This statement serves to suggest that it is not the classic tradition
which is so much to account for the contempt of men
like C. P. Snow for traditional, or literary, culture, as
it is the excesses of "naturalism," "existentialism," and
the "Nothing is absolute" syndrome. The relatively
recent, burgeoning scientific culture is an optimistic,
forward-looking, powerful, and meritorious one which,
understandably, would feel nothing but disdain for the
desperate die-hards of the new literary aristocracy who
retain their hold on their rank by continuing to amplify
their own clever insight into man's totally absurd existence.
But as it is true that many of our humanism-bred
exponents have atrophied, it is also true that far too
many progressives, in their speculations on the humanistic culture, have used an argument like Snow's
to relegate all or most of humanism, notably literature,
to the hades of insignificance, even to that of the debilitation of society. "Contemplaters of navels" and
"idlers" are the mildest of the names invented by Industry, Science, Business, and Politics for the humanists,
- again, notably writers. If it were to our purpose
here we could defend the humanists in terms of their
being the ones who at the cost of their own comfort
delineated the very discoveries which Industry, Science,
Business, and Politics have long since claimed as their
own. The ideas that man ought to be free to produce
and consume; that the universe is intelligible and that
man is cognitive; that man ought to be free to buy and
sell are not new. The great political discoveries, such
as that of the dignity of man, the idea of government of,
by, and for the populace, and freedom of speech were
dearly paid for by the life of Socrates, the head of More,
and the essays of Locke being put on the Index Librorum Prohibitorum.

The Requisite Magnitude
It is more to our purpose, however, to ask if tragedy
is fully and fairly represented in the charge, so rampant recently, that it frustrates progress by repeatedly
calling attention to individual and collective pathos,
that it gives rise to fatalism and widespread dejection,
that it does not, in Sir Charles Snow's words, "limit
the area of tragedy," taking "nothing as tragic that
can conceivably lie within men's will."
The fate-responsibility symbiosis of the tragic tradition enables and compels us to reply, patently and
unequivocally, that tragedy is not fully and fairly
represented in such an allegation.
The allegation, popular though it is, is yet less widespread than that which gave rise to it, namely, the
failure to perceive and to appreciate tragedy's central
paragon: human fate and human responsibility.
Tragedy, with the same kind of Titanic compulsion
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that drives science, has discovered a principle about
Man as cosmic as the principle of gravitation is in relation to the outward creation. That principle is that
nobility, perfection, and truth consist in recognizing
one's absolute responsibility for his acts and their outcome, whether he understands them or not, for they
are the expressions of his will, even if, like Oedipus,
one does not will to murder his father when he wills
to murder a man. In formulaic terms, tragedy posits
a series of simultaneous equations: 1, Man equals the
sole determinant of Fate (just as in science Principle or
Law equals the sole determinant of Phenomena); 2,
Fate is directly proportional, qualitatively, to Man's
Acts; 3, Man's Acts are qualitatively directly proportional to Man's Will; and therefore, 4, Fate is directly
proportional to Man's Will. Although this series is
rather over-simplified, it is not difficult to see that
it is the very pith of revelation, of exhortation, of constructiveness. And, in Snow's own words, it certainly
takes "nothing as tragic that can conceivably lie within
men's will," for it concerns itself precisely with the
will as seen in the deeds.
The tragic lesson has been quite as difficult for Tragic Man to learn as has been the velocity of light for
the physicist. Indeed, every great tragedy is a learning
anew of that tragic lesson that fate unfolds in a codified
reaction to man's deeds which, in their turn, comprise
that for which man is ultimately accountable.
It is not tragic that a man should learn of his responsibility; it is only tragic when he learns of it belatedly,
after fate has begun to measure to him as he has measured. But tragedy is "staged" not only from the standpoint of its production, but also from the standpoint
that the genre as a whole and as a tradition is not permitted to develop at random. It is held strictly to the
development dictated by tradition and playwright.
It thus becomes a necessity in tragedy that the hero
learn the tragic lesson belatedly; the achievement of
the essence of tragedy is contingent upon this. Tragedy,
however, goes much further. It does not leave Tragic
Man hopelessly alone and undone. Rather, it catapults
the tragic hero to the rank of highest laud, for that
man alone among men of earth has beheld himself,
has bent his stiff neck and looked inward. He has learned the lesson of absolute responsibility, and even if
the discovery kills him he at least has not met death
as spiritually prematurely as we the non-tragic shall.
Tragedy teaches us that there is nobility in trial by
fire, even if one is defeated, for death can destroy only
the body, not the discovery and not the new-found
stature.
Finally, the image of man suggested by the legacy
of tragic drama is at the very least comparable to that
suggested by science. As science puts its faith in both
the intelligibility of the universe and the cognitive
faculty of man, tragedy rests ultimately on the faith
that fate is not arbitrary and that man can know himse If. Beyond this, the tragic image of man is one of
The Cresset

pathos tempered with power, for tragic man has learned,
like Socrates, to know himself, and if knowledge is
power, then self-knowledge must be power of, or over,
self. More than this, it is the power over fate - not
over inexorability, for fate will always be inexorable.
Rather, tragedy bequeaths to man power over the
inscrutability, and therefore the dread, of fate . It ennobles man by demonstrating that he, like Oedipus of
old, is capable of the maturity and strength and magnitude requisite to say :
But the hand that struck me was none but my own. 9
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From the Chapel

The Reformation and the Revitalizing of our Words
By NORMAN E- NAGEL
De11n of the Ch•pel
Vlllp•rlliso University

We have murdered words. They can be killed_ They
are born alive - implanted by God, conceived by
man and brought forth an expression, a piece, a child
of man. A word is an act of creation, a sharing in the
Creator's activity. It is an appropriation of his gifts
as witness Adam's naming of the creatures, and of Eve.
The life of the triangular relationship was by words.
From God to Adam: "For you to embrace, cherish
and enjoy ." And Adam embraced the unique wonder of each creature as he named it and received it
from God. So he named woman, wife and companion
for sharing the splendor with. First the naming, then
the knowing, as Genesis puts it. Adultery attempts
to reverse this or does not even try to reach beyond
the destructive use of the thing requisite for copulation. Words have suffered similar destructive usage.
The history of words tells the history of man. It tells
of the Fall. Our language is littered with words prostituted and killed, rendered neutral or demonic. We
watch the politicians and advertisers throw around
the words that are perverted or dead. With one another we find ourselves using words as tools of manipulation. Authors and dramatists have depicted for
us the collapse of words, and hence the resort to grunting and screaming.
And there any words left which still have life in
them? When the words are all dead then so are we.
Hollow men make hollow words. Today we celebrate
the Reformation and that was a wordy enterprise,
and so appropriately also this Festival sermon. There
are those who are impatient with Luther who instead
of going on with his endless preaching, saying the
same thing over and over again, might have capitalized
October 1969

on his potential political power and furthered various worthwhile social causes. Destalinization in Eastern Europe has produced a bit more hopeful attempts
at politicizing Luther, but it is not easy going, for Luther never gets clear of the God question. God is in
everything, and not a God who fits the Marxist categories for disposing of God, but the living God, not
some thought-up God, some god of an idea, but the
living God who speaks. A wordless God presents no
problems, but a God who speaks is intolerable and
inescapable. Yet what he says looks contradictory and
there may therefore, perhaps be escape from some
of it by taking refuge in part of it.
Luther's refusal to suppress any of the evidence
is documented in his profound and shocking Bondage of the Will. Luther neither selects what seems
satisfactory nor does he excuse God. He does not sentimentalize or limit God to the nice things. Cancer
cells derive their vitality from the power of God and
He exercises control over them. He wouldn't be God
if he didn't, not God full blast. To look square at the
evidence is to suspect a malignant God. Our particular stomachs are too full for us to see that readily,
and fear runs from any such recognition. The biochemists' work on genes and their manipulation leave
little haven for such fear. The God acknowledged
in the Bondage of the Will is not discommoded by
discoveries of how we are determined, by test tube
babies or the chemistry of personality. Luther was
prostrated by God. The terrible God whose power
and whose wrath are only all too evident and inescapable.
His power hits us at every turn and his demands
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are written into our chromosomes and come at us in
the claims that are made on us by people and creation. There is no place to hide from the almighty God
who has in his hands the cancer, the earthquake, the
maggot and the meteor. A merely almighty God is ambiguous, and wordless hidden. Yet God's speaking
is not necessarily a help. The Bible has plenty of words
of God's holy wrath and curse upon every contradiction of his will. The history of man is full of such contradiction and such wrath and 1..urse. If we would answer back, "Why damnable, if determined?" Luther's
rejoinder is, "What God does is right, because he does
it." There is no Archimedian point by which we can
budge God. Any such claim involves the attempted
replacement of God by me, and I, reluctant though
I am to admit it, am not really cut out for the job. God
can scrap the lot and nobody can say him nay, or call
a foul on him.
Why doesn't he scrap it? I would, for I think in terms
of returns for me, and also do the gods of human construction. He does not. He gets into the whole gonewrong mess with us as one of us. He takes the curse
and consequence of the contradiction of God and we
hear the appalling cry of dereliction, "My God, my
God, why hast thou forsaken me?" If we are dumbfounded by God in the exercise of his power and his
wrath what can we make of this? The God who suffers crucifixion, the God who suffers himself to be
rejected.
The Word that made the world became flesh and
dwelt among us and his glory we behold is this: his
throne a cross to which he would draw all men to himself, not with irresistible power but with love and so
with resistible words. He draws them to himself through
his words, suffering himself thereby to be rejected.
This is the way forgiveness, reconciliation and love
are given. When he said, "Let there be light," this
was a word of irresistible almighty power. When he
says "Let there be forgiveness and lived love," he suffers himself to be rejected. Yet when forgiveness and
lived love are received they are altogether his gift.
They are bestowed by his words which bestow what
they say, for they are His words. He is personally
involved in his words, pieces of Him which give of
Him what they say. With the words of men the deed
must be added for them to have worth. With the words
of God the deed is one with the word. When it is a
word of almighty power its deed is irresistible. When
it is a Gospel word of forgiveness and benediction
the deed is in the word, but here rejection and contradiction are possible. The application of power in
the bestowal of Gospel gifts would eliminate them.
Only his love for us can awaken our love for him. We
are here close to the heart of God, and here we cannot explain but only adore.
Divine words carry their freight, their deed with
them. Either power and judgment irresistibly, or forgiveness and lived love resistibly. The words do their
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job and the carrier of the words has only to carry them,
the rest is God's doing whose words they are.
Hence Luther's quiet confidence in waiting to see
what God would do. His victories are the only lasting ones.
They are not, however, just inward, spiritual, or
wafted-off heavenly victories, but are worked through
the brain and muscle and blood of men. Calvary. The
paralytic first received forgiveness of sins and then
his body was made whole. Jesus preached and healed. Both.
Healing without preaching is ambiguous. The Pharisees had explanations for Jesus' healings. The devil
and antichrist have their miracles too, and a plausible explanation why a man goes off to help the starving Biafrans can be given by a psychiatrist, and on
his heels by a biochemist.
The slogan "Feed first, preach later," has only a
qualified cogency. When Jesus did not heal because
of unbelief it was not because he lacked the power.
A healing with his forgiving words rejected would
leave a man worse off than before though healed. A
deed without a word is as ambiguous and as of doubtful use as a word without a deed. Luther drives this
truth to breaking point when he says that if he had
to choose between the words and deeds of Jesus he
would choose the words.
There is so much healing to be done. But if we are
to be saved from going at it as if we had taken over
from God, or from using Christ as a club, or from cynical withdrawal because of frustration, we must first
receive the words which bestow forgiveness and the
love to be for others. We go at it without having to
prove anything, without having to justify ourselves,
because we know who we are, and what we are for.
God has by his word told and made us who we are
and by his word supplied the lively courage and guidance. And we shall know what can be given with power
and what cannot.
The slums are not your only opportunity. On the
college campus where you do not find many hungry,
sick, naked or in prison the role of words is vital. Just
having time to talk without pursuing some advantage for yourself is vital. Talking with words that are
alive, words that carry you - resistibly - there for
another's sake with respect and caring implicitly carry
Christ. There is no substitute for his explicit bestowing words: the Absolution with its bestowal of forgiveness and the Eucharist with its conjunction of word,
bread, and body. It is from His words that our words
may be revitalized. With them we serve to quicken
one another in embracing, cherishing, and enjoying
each creature of God and naming it as we have been
named.
A University where Christ's gospel words enliven
words and life might well be called Lutheran. Our
Reformation Day prayer should ask that Christ in
His mercy grant us this for His name's sake.
The Cresset
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Political Affairs

The Military as a Force for Political Development
------------------------------------------------------------------------ByALBERTR. TROST

Military intervention in the politics of a developing state in Asia, Africa, or Latin America is so common that some commentators dismiss it as a permanent feature of the culture, impregnable to the Western democratic reformer. Nevertheless, it is condemned by pious Americans and some Europeans who see
themselves as sitting in the highly principled chair
of civilian rule, a principle that may be more myth
than fact. The view that is held by many Americans
is that when the generals or colonels come, the individual is forgotten, be he peasant or intellectual. In
fact, however, military intervention in developing
states cannot be condemned on the grounds of some
Western democratic principle. Many military regimes,
Nasser in the United Arab Republic and the present
government in Peru, are much more reform-minded than the civilian regimes they replaced. They make
a genuine effort to maximize the position of the individual in their nation by extending the voting franchise, breaking the power of large land-owners, and
extending some welfare services.
The real problem of military intervention in the
developing world is neither the goals of the officers
nor their record of achievement. On these two measures they are neither better nor worse than civilian
regimes. The real problem is their tenure in office,
or to put it another way, the potential stability of their
political regime. Military intervention is symptomatic of the underdeveloped state of the political systems. Some political scientists describe this condition
as retarded institutionalization. That is, the institutions of the political system (political parties, a National Assembly, a Cabinet, or labor unions, etc. ) are
not viewed as legitimate by a sizable portion of the
politically active people. One might say that the constitution is not legitimate so the political system does
not have clearly defined rules or boundaries. Under
these conditions, that group with the monopoly of
force, violence and technological expertise becomes
the arbiter of political conflict. This is the army. When
the political institutions or the constitution gain some
legitimacy, they can take over this role of neutral arbiter.
To bring real stability the military must do more
than simply institute reforms and then turn power
back to civilian groups. It must use its monopoly of
power to transfer legitimacy to institutions other than
the armed forces. It must build up political parties
and interest groups, that is, foster institutionalized
mass participation. (It should be pointed out that I
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do not see stability as a goal in itself, or as a desirable
condition to further American foreign policy. Rather,
stability is required to overcome the crises of economic underdevelopment, poverty.) If the officers do
not foster this institutionalization, their political system will continue on the merry-go-round of underdevelopment or instabjlity until some other superior
force, such as a mass revolutionary movement, does
the job.
The record of military regimes in this regard has
been almost entirely negative. At the beginning of
1969, the attention of political scientists and others
interested in political development was directed toward Pakistan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea).
At last, it seemed that two military-backed regimes
understood their task and were taking action in that
direction. Pakistan faced the most obstacles, a nation
divided into two parts by India, each part characterized
by a distinct economy and ethnic group. The more
populated and disadvantaged East Pakistan distrusts
the politically ascendant West Pakistanis. In addition, Pakistan was troubled by a tradition of political corruption and graft. The obstacles proved too
much for the military-supported regime of Field Marshall Mohammad Ayub Khan. In March of this year,
the generals consulted and decided that the only way
to preserve their ruling position in the face of student
unrest and revolt in East Pakistan was to dump Field
Marshall Ayub. He was replaced by General Yahya
Khan, who scrapped Ayub's failing plan for institutionalization, called the Basic Democracies, and announced his intention to return rule to civilians in
a short time. At this time, it looks very doubtful that
the military will be able to institutionalize the political regime in Pakistan.
This left only South Korea as a possible bright spot
among the military regimes. Economic and social
conditions were more favorable here than in Paki·stan. The military came to power in a coup in 1961
that replaced a corrupt and divided civilian regime.
As is typical of many coups in developing nations,
this one was headed by reform-minded military men
who were able to produce some impressive short-range
results. But one of the leaders in the coup, General
Chung Hee Park, began to move beyond the short
run. He showed an unusual amount of deference
for the constitution, shedding his uniform to run for
President in 1963. More important for institutionalization, he used his undisputed monopoly of force
and position to build a political party, the Democra19

tic-Republicans. Although undoubtedly discriminated against, an opposition was even allowed to operate in the open and contest elections. President Park
was re-elected for a constitutional second term in 1967.
This political development fed back into the economic system. Gross national product doubled during
his tenure and per capita income rose by more than
50%.
However, during 1968 rumors began to circulate
that President Park may want a third term, something
prohibited by the constitution. This desire has become almost official during the months of July and

August of 1969. It has been endorsed by the Democratic-Republican Party. After having encouraged
a legitimacy for a political regime broader than himself through a constitution, General Park now seems
headed toward a r-eturn to personal rule. A third term,
even if the constitutional changes can be made, will
tend to make President Park more indespensible than
the institutions he helped to build. It may be possible to continue to point to the regressive political development wrought by military regimes in the developing world. Let us hope that General Park changes
his mind by 1971.

Books of the Month

Two Mediators of Media
THE PLAY THEORY OF MASS COMMUNICATION. by William Stephenson.
Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1967 ($5.00).
MORALITY AND THE MASS MEDIA, by
Kyle Haselden . Nashville: Broadman Press,
1968 (paper, $2 .50).
That these two books, both now over a year
old , have not made major ripples among
Christian students of the mass media (not , at
least, within eye- and earshot of this reviewer)
is not so much a reflection on the worth of the
books as on our tardiness to see to it that we
are informed on the nature and use of the
media that impings with such regularity, if
not monotony , on our lives. Stephenson's
volume, collecting the psychologist's studies
in media theory , is a frequently technical
essay on the role of subjective play in people's
use of the media; Haselden's book, one of the
last pieces from the late editor of The Christian Century , is a thorough survey of the issues posed for morality by the mass media and vice versa. Together, the volumes do a
job for post-McLuhan media students - a
job somewhat overdue, in view of McLuhan's
rather uncritical affirmation of "the way it
is" in the media as good and P-roper (which
itself may have been a necessary reaction to
earlier, merely negative appraisals of the effectiveness and value of the mass media).
In The Play Theory of Mass Communication Stephenson , a psychologist in the School
of Journalism at the University of Missouri,
applies the "Q-technique" propounded in
his earlier volume, The Study of Behavior
(1953) , to the study of mass communication .
Unfortunately, in this reviewer's judgment,
he devotes so much space to justifying the
application of "Q-technique" to mass media
study that he seems to do little more than
assert a "play theory ," without detailed amplification and development of the theory,
its grounds , and its implications. But even
without that amplification , the book is suggestive of a new direction in media theory
that could be especially fruitful for the
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church's use of the mass media.
Briefly, Stephenson's argument is this:
while most students of mass communication
have focused on the transmission of information (an "information theory") , he proposes
a "play theory" as the focusing factor in mass
media study. Building on Huizinga's work in
Homo Ludens, Stephenson suggests that
"communication-pleasure" is a kind of subjective play which it is the special role of the
mass media to occasion. What is meant is not
merely that the mass media provide pleasurable entertainment; everyone recognizes that.
Rather, what is significant is the way in which
mass communication enables people to enjoy
themselves.
That significance emerges when one distinguishes between the principle of social
control and that of convergent selectivity .
While numerous theorists have recognized
and worked with the former concept, Stephenson sees a larger role for the mass media in
terms of the latter concept; convergent selectivity includes the whole realm of new modes
of behavior, fads and fancies , and other factors which allow us to exist for ourselves and
to please ourselves in relative freedom from
social control. "When one buys this or that
toothpaste, car, or cookie, one has a certain
freedom to decide for himself, under conditions not available to him before." These conditions , Stephenson maintains, ought not be
regarded as self-destructive but as self-enhancing and self-developing. Thus, far from
studying the mass media as means of persuasion or of the transmission of information,
one ought to study the media as agents of
entertainment, as means for providing materials for that subjective play in which the
individual has free choices for his self-development.
Stephenson's best illustration of the play
theory is his analysis of Pope's The Rape of
the Lock . The poet takes a tiny incident and
provides lavish embellishments, merely to
celebrate the moment and its fun. Freudian
interpretations may abound , Marxists may

see in it an attack on the profligacy of the
bourgeoisie, but Stephenson sides with those
who regard Pope's intent as pure fun.
Instead of dull Marx, nasty Freud, or ponderous metaphysician, all dealing with
problems in the real world, Pope gives us
a poem to play with in the mind, with joy,
wit, fun, delight, freedom, rapture, fancy,
ecstasy, and a bit of naughtiness , all in
step in unalloyed fantasy.
This is subjective play, regarded as pure
communication-pleasure. . .. If we are ...
open to joy, reading the poem gives us
the selfsame satisfactions. And this is the
core of our theory .
Thus, for one schooled in the effective use of
the mass media, they provide an almost unlimited source of the raw materials for selfenhancing subjective play, for the fantasy
that enriches the human spirit and human
culture.
Haselden's book, Morality and the Mass
Media , is a slightly expanded version of lectures prepared in 196 7 for a conference of
the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention. Three basic parts
attempt a definition of "authentic morality ,"
analyze and diagnose several problems posed
by the mass media for that authentic morality
and propose a Christian response to those
issues.
After making the rather obvious distinctions between the two extremes in current
(or are they perennial?) ethical thinking,
legalism and relativism, Haselden suggests
that "authentic morality" so includes elements of both extremes as to be neither of
them. Its constituting elements are these:
its focus is on people, not institutions or traditions or principles; its objective is to transform people into persons, to "make it possible for human beings to be human" ; it requires a habitat of freedom if it is to flourish;
its criterion is love, and not merely "benevolence," but a drive toward unity of persons ;
and , basic to all of this , authentic morality
has God as its source.
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Authentic morality then focuses on people to produce persons, a process that requires freedom as an indispensable climate and a love that is more than all loves
as its standard and energy. This love, perfectly revealed to us in Jesus Christ, has
its origin in the God who is love.
Against that background, Haselden inquires
after the effect of the mass media "on authentic morality, particularly on the transformation of people into persons."
In a chapter on the "uses of mass media"
Haselden adopts a position which Stephenson
would regard as equivocating at best. While
he grants that "entertainment that has no
moralistic or educational value but which
simply entertains is greatly to be preferred
as a temporary escape from oneself and one's
problems to numerous other ways by which
men duck the hard challenges of life," he
counts it a hazard that "innocuous escapist
entertainment will become for most Americans an increasing and unbreakable addiction that gradually diminishes them as persons." From Stephenson's perspective, of
course, Haselden is hung up on an information theory of the uses of the mass media.
We might add that his understanding of authentic morality previously outlined does
not seem to inform his argument at this point
either. On the contrary, he introduces the
totally new concept of escapism which may
be either innocuous or harmful depending on
whether or not it is addictive and therefore
debilitating. A little escapism is harmless ,
while too much is damaging - like any other
"too much." If Stephenson is right, however,
that "little escapism" is not just not harmful, but is in fact a positive good , for it is the
opportunity for the subjective play that is
necessary for the free self-enhancement of
persons. Is that old "work ethic" Haselden's
bugaboo here? It seems to be.
Subsequent chapters take up the questions
of censorship, obscenity, advertising and
commercialism, the barbaric invasion of sexand-violence into entertainment, and the
problems of legislating morality. To this reviewer, the outstanding pages in these chapters contain Haselden's critique of McLuhan's
pronouncements; these refreshingly blunt
comments alone are worth the price of the
book . He dismisses McLuhan as a "sloganeer,
a preacher, an intellectual con man" whose
theory "is a great deal of error mixed with
some truth for which the author claims too
much. . .he takes a partly true premise media influence us apart from their content and moves with it toward a wholly false conclusion ; i.e. , we should concentrate our attention and our study on the media rather
than on their content."
While McLuhan's position is media-affirming, tending to accept as true and beyond
criticism whatever is discernable in the role
and effect of the mass media in our society,
Haselden's position seems to emphasize criticism, seeking to provide grounds for criticising both the media and the message. McLuhan adopts an affirmative view of the
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media, Haselden a basically negative/ critical
view. Stephenson seems to provide for an
alternative to affirmative McLuhanism and
critical Haseldenism; his principles of convergent selectivity and communicationspleasure provide a ground for discriminating
within the realm of the mass media. By stressing the various contexts in which the media
reach people and the aspects of life touched
by them , Stephenson's theory enables one to
discern those areas where the media are really
effective and those which are in fact beyond
the capability of the media. In the realm of
"social control," which includes religious
creeds and commitments, the mass media
have at best a limited effectiveness; the intimate community there called for is beyond
the ability of the mass media to create. In the
realm of convergent selectivity, however,
with its less intimate kind of community and
its emphasis on manners , tastes, and fads,
the mass media come into their own. Thus,
the media cannot be counted on to produce
(that is, in normal situations, leaving the
work of Goebbels and his ilk out of consideration) new kinds of commitments, conversions
to new points of view; the media tend more
to re-inforce than to convert.
If this is true , and I think it is, then the standard approach of churches to the mass media
is, from the outset, doomed to frustrating
ineffectiveness. For all the promotional ballyhoo, it does not appear that the "Lutheran
Hour" and the "This is the Life" and all the
other denominational offerings for broadcasting's "God-ghetto" of Sunday morning
public service time are ever going to do more
than appeal to those people who are already
inclined to receive their offerings. Thus, instead of using space in Sunday bulletins to
marshal an audience for the corny and cloying
story-lines of the latest full-color episode
from denominational headquarters (via Hollywood , of course), pastors would be well advised to stimulate an audience for the best
of "secular" programming. The result, at
least, would be some improvement in the
average quality of programs. Warren Rubel
put it well in his report on the Cultural Activities Study at Concordia Seminary (St. Louis):
The church probably serves the media
best when she respects the media for what
they are and consequently does not offer
"canned" programming to the audience particularly on television. The church
needs to remember to be herself rather
than attempt to be something else in her
approach to the mass audience. Honesty
about the church need not lead the
church to be anything but professional
in mass media ministries. In fact , under
increasing commercial and financial pressure, the church needs to support the missions of the various media with the best
talent and support she can muster.
Secondly, recogruzmg the confirmingrather-than-converting role of the mass media,
the church can look to the image it presents
to and through the media - not in the sense
of creating a false front, but in the sense of

reforming itself where it is in need of reforming, so that when, by being its best self, it
attracts the attention of the media, it can be
seen with its true purposes standing in the
fore. In this view, the church is not prostituting the media in a vain attempt to re-make
the media into extensions of the evangelistic
pulpit; rather the media function with their
own integrity, and the church, by being its
true self, finds itself worthy of the media's
attention. It is not difficult to imagine the
infinitely superior results from a newsreport
about some bit of authentic churchmanship
on, say, the "Huntley-Brinkley Report," than
from !he entire history of "This is the Life."
(The trouble, of course, is that American
Christianity is frequently so irrelevant that
Messrs. Huntley and Brinkley rarely have
their attention drawn to it.) All this is to sugge~t that basic to any consideration of "the
church and the mass media" is a church that
really is alive with the Gospel.
Thirdly, this view necessitates serious study
of the mass media by the church . Competent
administration of ecclesiastical media programs requires study of the media, in all their
secularity, and not merely evangelistic zeal.
At a 1967 conference of the domestic and
international staffs of "The Lutheran Hour,"
for example, there was not a single affirmative
answer to this reviewer's question: "Has
anyone read anything by McLuhan?" Its operating board could boast not a single professional broadcaster. The church will not succeed in its mass media ministries without
studied competence in the media.
A final note: Stephenson's play theory,
for all its success in opening new directions
for our reflection on the mass media, still
fails to provide grounds for discriminating
and valuing one kind of media-oriented play
over another. As long as it is "conducive to
culture" and to "self-enhancement," it gets
his approval. Haselden is rightly suspicious
of any suggestion that all play is harmless ; it
may be excessive escapism and not creative
fantasy. But both Haselden and Stephenson
view play only from the viewpoint of its ends
and purposes; theologically, it seems, play
may be more significantly qualified by its
grounds. For play is a possibility for the Christian on the grounds of his being-cared-for by
God. His play is played out as a part of his
praise of the God in whose care he rests - and
plays - confidently. Play that is not played
out in praise of God is bound to go sour, for
it must harbor the anxiety that play may , or
must, end in order to resume the care of one's
life. But the Christian's work, like his play,
is part of the doxology of his life. He may
therefore play with the media's offerings
without Haselden's uneasiness over excessive
escapism, when his play is part of his praise.
And then, as Haselden advocates, he also
has grounds to plunge creatively and correctively into the use of the media, to celebrate there his vision of true humanity in
Jesus Christ.
DAVID G . TRUEMPER
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The Theatre

Report from Abroad - II
----------------------------------------------------------------------------ByVWALTERSORELL

Having reported on Tony Richardson's attempt
at the creation of a free theatre last month, I was surprised to find in Switzerland the same struggle for
a gratis theatre by Werner Duggelin, the artistic director of the Basel theatres, a man of ideas and great
initiative. He has not yet given up his fight, although
he has met with ridicule and skepticism. I become
more and more convinced that we will soon have two
kinds of theatres all over the world, the traditional
and the new theatre, ritualistic, democratized, experimental.
In was in Zurich that I caught up with the Royal
Shakespeare Company and its extraordinary production of Troilus and Cressida . Much has been written
about this cleverly staged debunking of the Greek
·heroes, a truly contemporary approach to a very difficult play. The difficulty lies mainly in staging credible battle scenes, a hurdle that was skillfully overcome.
They had a stylized, choreographic appearance, with
a touch of cinematic slow-motion at the climactic moment - a perfect example of how movement has become an essential part of modern stage craft.
It is, no doubt, a vacillating play that cannot make
up its mind whether it has enough satiric bite or adheres to the classic ideal of the inevitable Moira . It
has enough in it of both, throwing the weight of Pandarns, the matchmaker, Thersites, the fool , and the
intellectualized Achilles on the scale of the satire.
Add to it the heroes, most of whom are characterized
as stupid, boasting, blownup zeroes. On the other hand,
the Trojan women, Troilus, and Hector walk around
with the doom of their fate written into each word
and gesture. The lightness and beauty of the love story
turns into a bitter farce on love and fidelity in John
Barton's staging. It was superbly acted and left a deep
impression, proving how much can be done with pointed stylization in contrast to any · realistic interpretation.
Another highlight of the Zurich theatre festival
was the Noh Theatre of the Umawaka group from
Tokyo. Although the Schauspielhaus was sold out
each night, the unprepared audience watched these
ritual plays with bewilderment, politeness and, toward the end of the evening, with obvious ennui. The
esoteric Noh plays are based on symbolic movement
and a highly sophisticated text. With the action told
by actors and chorus, with a minimum of movement
happening on stage, the static impression is hard to
take for the length of a whole evening, hardened by
the cacophonous music and unintelligible words. The
eyes of Western man are concentrated on the beautiful costumes and the bit of motion there is, not under-
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standing, of course, the weighty arguments that lie
in the slightest gesture of the hand or in the opening
of a fan.
Only the broad comic action of the Kyogen which
the company performed between two Noh plays was
greeted with relief and laughter. The happenings
on stage were sufficiently farcical to help the audience
over the language problem. The movements were
acrobatically skillful. The singing of the actors in contrast to the singing of the chorus in the serious
Noh plays - was amusing. To make the West meet
the East halfway on an intelligible level of theatrical communication, a short lecture-demonstration
should precede such performances.
Zurich, too, has its off-Broadway theatres, and one
of them, the Theater am Neumarkt, produced Slawomir Mrozek's Once More From the B_eginning,
a farcical attack on militarism and dictatorship, on
the sheepishness of man and the absurdities of his
institutions. Mrozek, a refugee from Communist Poland, has become famous for his satire, Tango. The
new play is far more diffuse than Tango and less hardhitting.
It may be all wrong to report first about one of several little theatres in Vienna, famous for its music and
opera. But Stella Kadman's Theater der Courage had
the courage of producing Jean-Loup Dabadie, who
belongs with the Parisian avant-garde. His Scarlet
Family is a tragic farce. All members of the family
are utter failures who reveal themselves by accusing
the other members of the family all the time. The
tone of this black comedy is one of a boulevard comedy run amuck. The humor ·is cruel, the poetic tenderness macabre; everything is wrong with everyone,
but in a most amusing manner. The murder of the
old man, a most fabulous figure as long as he is silent
throughout the first act, is treated with a heartening,
at moments hysterical, disinterestedness.
The only trouble with this refreshing idea and forward approach to the theatre of dark humor is that
it has a second act at all, which, with its many flashbacks and its supernatural undertone, sounds false.
Since Act Two does not, and does not intend to, solve
anything, the play goes downhill, adding little new
amusement or enlightenment to the first act. The Scarlet Family was very well staged and acted. As a long
one-act play it would have been even more hilariously funny and poignant.
That comedies usually suffer from a bad final act
is a commonplace. The Theater in der Josefstadt,
famous for its ensemble acting, proved this point with
Harold Brighouse's Hobson's Choice. The acting
The Cresset

was the best I have seen in a long time, but this somewhat synthetic period play ran out of steam after a
short while, and its humor became too clumsy and
predictable.
The Volkstheater produced an ill-fated dramatization of Raskolnikoff in seventeen scenes by Walter Lieblein, who could not free himself from the mere
retelling of the Dostoevski story while skimming over
its real depth and religious meaning.
The Viennese still show an attitude of reluctant

acceptance toward their great avant-garde composers,
Schonberg, Alban Berg, and von Webern, wondering how it could happen that they were Viennese.
They were featured in many concerts during the Vienna Festivals, but more English than German speaking people paid hQmage to these musical giants of
our century. However, I saw Alban Berg's Lulu at
the Vienna State Opera where it received the best
production I have ever come across. The Vienna Opera,
as it seems, is still the artistic landmark of this city
of "wine, women, and song."

Music

The Winds of Change
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - B y WILLIAM F. EIFRIG, JR.

Readers of this column - their number and patience is unmeasured - have long ago realized there
is no plan to the subjects treated monthly. The topic may relate to an anniversary observed in the month
of publication. It may be seasonal or current news.
Often classroom obligations have suggested items
for review. There have been months in which caprice
must be held the culprit for the joumalistic foibles
thrust on an innocent and unsuspecting public.
Now there has come an opportunity to mend ways.
The new editor, my own desire for increased ideaabrasion, and sloth have combined to suggest a course
of activity new to this column. With every month in
the past there came a sharp sensation, not the pain
of setting pen to paper but the realization that the
column was indeed a platform from which a single
voice inflicted upon its audience one man's thoughts,
opinions, and fancies. At its best it can be the pulpit
of the inspired preacher; at its worst it is the soapbox
of the enthusiastic ranter. Most often (we hope) it has
been the easy chair of the gentle conversationalist.
In all cases the reader was made subject to a single
mind simply because the ideas and mode of presentation were so very predictable, even if the topics were
not.
To do battle with this state of affirs we propose to
bring to the faithful several voices. We hope thereby to catch the reader's mind in a crossfire of ideas
and urge it gently or ungently into a position of its
own, taken up wherever the reader feels safest in the
forthcoming shoot out. Several members of the University's music department have been coaxed, cajoled, persuaded, and tricked - each according to his
particular weakness - into submitting a column. The
music editor retires these months to the editing desk
as befits his title.
The task of motivating his esteemed colleagues
led the editor to the venerable pedagogical device,
the assignment. To ask them to write on whatever
their minds came upon risked postponed deadlines
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and would perhaps tempt the Holy Spirit. Better therefore to ask them to address their thoughts to a given.
Finally, it promised rich fruit to have all dig in the
same field. Each was asked to write at least in the direction of a single topic. The topic itself was suggested by political and ecclesiastical events and by concems voiced on all sides, the editor himself being
one deeply concemed.
The times and our people call for change, but the
purposes and goals of the changes are not always clear.
The line of battle between conservative and liberal
is drawn more clearly than are the distinctions between the uniforms wom on both sides. Prudence
and practical necessity have thrown together partisans startled to find themselves joined in a common
enterprise with uncommon equipment and experience. Of late a church body meeting in synodical
convention has pledged itself to active fellowship
with another church body, giving official recognition to unity in diversity.
What then for the musician? An attempt to establish standards of excellence based on a German musical tradition appropriate to the descendents of Saxon
immigrants is seemingly obsolete before it has achieved
its purpose. What standards are available now? For
some the Church is to go into the world; for others
the world is to be brought into the Church. Are tradition and innovation so out of balance? Is the future
only to the innovators?
The men to be heard in the next months in the music comer of The Cresset will take stands in this maelstrom of cultural thought as they speak to the question: What is Lutheran about music and what is musical about Lutheranism?
To release the reader from the
single-mindedness and to provide
which tempers rational endeavors
will interject columns in the more
price.

monotony of this
the unreasonable
the music editor
usual spirit of ca-
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The Visual Arts

Street Art
RICHARD H. W. BRAUER
By CONSTANCE F. PARVEY

A definition of art is as complex and mysterious as
the history of man himself. Since the time of the cave
paintings of Altamira, man has attempted to master the
unknown and the fearful by capturing it in the imagery
of dance, movement, and pictorial representation. Art
in the earliest expressions known to man was not just
storytelling or illustration It was not self-conscious,
nor was it tied up with moneymaking It was the exploration of a man's dreams, of his fears, and of the magic
oflife.
There is a little of this feeling in the current street
art which is now in mode. In Boston, last summer it
was "Summerthing" - a city-wide summer arts program
for low and middle income communities. From a cynical
point of view, one could call this escapist art, an attempt
to heighten the spirits of those who are trapped in the
city, in its crowds and in its heat. Though this point is
not to be forgotten, there is a cathartic value in focusing
on neighborhood art - turning vacant lots into instant
playgrounds, wheeling in Jazzwagons for teen-agers,
and conducting painting classes for children. The end
result is that people come together, they organize in
their own neighborhoods, and local talent is developed.
All this adds to building a spirit of trust and happiness
where there are many reasons for fear and often too few
reasons for happiness.
The spirit which "Summerthing" has managed to convey to everyone, whether they live in one of these 14
neighborhoods or not, is that there is new blood coming
into the tired veins of old Boston. Within the miles of
bleak, treeless, asphalt streets there is a human spirit

that is finding a way to transcend the monotony and the
static quality of the low-income worker's life - which
represents the majority of people in Boston. Any night
for eight weeks, people in the neighborhoods could prepare themselves for something to happen, and something always did. In at least half of the neighborhoods
there would be free entertainment, food for reasonable prices, and an open atmosphere.
What does this kind of artistic activity really mean?
Is the fostering of it just another side-stepping of the
economic, racial, and social realities created by urban
America? Or is it a new step in the direction of building
a society that has more equality, more freedom, and that
can be a more enjoyable place to live? If these programs
can keep their grass-roots base in the neighborhood, the
latter possibility can definitely emerge. We have moved
out of the era of the social worker serving the neighborhood from outside into an era when it is the artist
living in or relating to the neighborhood who helps the
community to find its own expression, to talk about
its problems, voice its hopes, feelings, and sensitivities. The drama and dance that have come out of this
program are reminiscent of the days of the bard and the
jongleur. The content of the drama is not so juicy as
Chaucer's Canterbury Tales, but there is a mixture of
playfulness and public satire.
In reflecting on street art, I can't help but think that
it might provide a very important key to working out a
way for cities to be more fit to live in. What we urban
dwellers suffer from most is isolation. We lack the opportunity for common work and for casual meeting. The
arts of conversation and celebration are atrophying. Yet

Photographs from Boston 's " Summerthing" - a city-wide summer
arts program for low and middle
income communities. 1969 .

robt. p. brown, jr.
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there is such a strong urge for coming together that over
a quarter of a million young people went to the Woodstock Folk Festival this last summer and about half that
many attended its British counterpart on the Isle of
Wight - the event that brought Bob Dylan out of his
three-year seclusion. But what the youth folk festivals
point to besides the need for common meeting, is the
need for mass action. There is so much idle energy
waiting around to be harnessed that it could be a powerful social force. Good as "Summerthing" can be, and
though it touched an impressive number of neighborhoods, it should be thought of only as a pilot project
for what might be done. Another year it could reach
into the comfortable neighborhoods as well, and direct
itself to the old as well as to the young, and to the interests of working men as well as those of teen-agers.
If programs such as "Summerthing" are going to help
to build the neighborhoods of the cities, they need to
be in touch with more of the varieties of the people who
live in those neighborhoods, not only with the children
and youth.
All of us are searching for ways to master the stresses
of present city life. We haven't yet thought of our skyscraper canyons as caves in which to express our fears
in order to overcome them. Programs like this are a
move in that direction, because they are helping people
loosen up their interior lives and realize that there are
things that ordinary people can do to make a better life
for themselves if they do them in concert with others.
This street art may not find its way to the galleries of
Paris, but on the other hand, it is not spoiled by pretentious prices. Perhaps we are back to a very primitive
question: why should people pay for what is free, for the
ability of man to use his mind and body to transform the
little circle of his life which is the platform for his ideas
and the theater for his own life? As an indigenous art
grew up in pioneer rural America, perhaps we are at the
beginning of an indigenous pioneering art in urban
America.
Karl Linn, initiator of the Neighborhood Commons
movement and an early advocate of inner city open
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space, feels that qut of the street art movement a new
role is emerging for the artist, not to serve the elite
patron, but to serve the common man. He helps the
ordinary neighborhood to explore the power of its own
spirit and message. Some college art departments are
already beginning to take steps in this direction by
taking the emphasis away from the isolated studio and
creating community workshop studies in neighborhoods
or among students on the campus itself.
Mrs. Lyndon Johnson started the campaign to improve
the quality of our environment by protecting the trees
and the countryside. The first urban counterpart of this
was the spring cleanup that Monsignor Fox organized
in about 400 neighborhoods in New York City in 1968.
Those people not only painted and planted, they threw
out tons of garbage. The massive organization of Monsignor Fox's event combined with programs like "Summerthing" could pave the way for enhancing the quality
of our urban environment by providing avenues for
mass participation that improve both the visual impact
and the human relations of our cities.
Street art does not start with the dynamic interaction
of colors and cubes, but with the dynamics of people in
real-life situations. It is not even a Happening which
has a quality of make-believe. It begins with the everyday of life and then moves to drama and dance. It is an
art that transforms the movie house projection screen
into the neighborhood projection wall. It is too early
to judge it by aesthetic standards·. That will depend on
many things and take time.
Meanwhile, there are vast and unexplored fields for
young artists who are willing to venture into the art
of enabling others to create expressive new urban environments for themselves, and there are miles and
miles of cinder blocks and plenty of vacant lots.
In an effort to develop a continuing forum on art by artists and others
in the church, this column will be opened from time to time to invited
guest writers. Constance F. Parvey is a writer and lecturer on liturgy
and theology, fine arts and architecture, and the social impact of the
urban environment. She has been on the Lutheran Campus Ministry
Staff of various universities across the country and an executive producer of a TV series on urban problems.
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Editor-At-Large

By .JOHN STRIETELMEIER

A Hymn for Severe Weather

Last summer, going through some of my great-grandfather's books, I came upon the 1865 edition of a Kirchen-Gesangbuch fuer Evang.-Lutherische Gemeinden ungeaenderter A ugsburgischer Confession, and
in it, under the heading "Bei schweren Gewittern,"
the following hymn:
Es donnert sehr, o lieber Gott,
Ach, sieh uns bei in dieser Noth;
Machs mit dem Wetter nicht zu lang,
Es ist uns herzlich angst und bang.
Freely translated, this stanza (the first of eleven)
goes something like this: "It's thundering hard, 0
dear God. See us through this difficulty. Don't let
this storm go on too long. It's really scaring us witless."
I must confess that my immediate reaction to this
hymn was one of amusement. We know - or like to
think we know - all about the mechanisms which
create thunderstorms, and not even the most simpleminded fundamentalist of the twentieth century can
really believe that some Zeus-like God turns them on
and off at will. There may still be here and there some
"poor Indian whose untutored mind sees God in nature, hears him in the wind." But the vast majority
of us who are neither poor Indians nor seventeenthcentury German Pietists can no longer look to prayer for shelter from the "Angst und Bang" of hostile
nature. Even if we are Christians, there is a great gulf
fixed in our minds between God and nature, between
meteorology and theology. Thunder may scare us
no less than it scared our remote ancestors, but man
come of age (as we are pleased, in the teeth of considerable evidence to the contrary, to call ourselves)
has at least the dry comfort of knowing that it is a
purely "natural" phenomenon. He does not have to
- and indeed really can not - reckon with the possibility that it might be a Voice speaking to him in
wrath and judgment.
But the question which we could well afford to ask
ourselves is whether these apparently radical discontinuities are as real as they seem to be. There is, quite
obviously, a level on which the meteorologist can adequately explain the phenomenon of thunder - so
adequately that it would be an act of intellectual dishonesty for him to pray, "Machs mit dem Wetter nicht
zu lang." But there is another and more profound
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level on which a thunderstorm remains inexplicable
in purely natural terms. At the point where a man
senses, however vaguely, that there is the potential
of death in a storm, what is on one level a purely natural phenomenon becomes on another level a confrontation with that fear of death which, as the Apostle
says, subjects our whole lives to bondage. The meteorologist can explain the storm, but the "Angst und
Bang" that it produces is quite outside his province.
The whole story of a thunderstorm runs in an unbroken line from the vigorous convectional overturning
in warm, humid air to the trembling soul which hears ·
in its ominous rumbling a reminder that "it is appointed to men once to die, and after this the judgment."
It was no small achievement of the human mind
and spirit to liberate man from the terror of capricious deities who hurled thunderbolts at him and
burnt up his fields and blew destructive winds across
his villages. But the achievement will be no great gain
if it leaves us captive to a cold naturalism which allows for no Kindly Light amid the encircling gloom,
no Mercy in the clouds we so much dread.
And this naturalism is likely to find - as indeed
it has found - its first victim in nature itself. What
modern man, without hope and without God in this
world, has done to his environment could not have
been done by either his· pantheist or Christian ancestors to whom this world was, in some sense, sacred
either because it participated in the divinity or because it was the very personal property of the Deity.
The pantheist, looking about him at our polluted
air and waters, our denuded hills, our defiled countryside, and our spreading junkyards, could only
see us as rapists of God. And the Christian would see
us as unfaithful stewards, guilty of the wanton destruction of our Lord's property.
Being of my own generation, I must confess that
I could not join Dr. Johann Saeubertus (died 1646)
in a prayer for divine intervention in a meteorological process. (I do not exclude the possibility that better Christians than I might do so.) But if I were President of the United States and looking for a Secretary
of the Interior, I would much rather have Dr. Saeubertus than Mr. Hickel. Dr. Saeubertus was not up
on his meteorology, but at least he was not a "developer."
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The Mass Media

Mis-Messaged Media
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------BvDONA.AFFELDT

You've got this medium, see, this vehicle, and you
ask yourself: What do you do with it? Oh sure, there
are some old stand-bys. You got a magazine, and over
the years you specialized in a certain kind of thing.
Take Ltfe magazine - you run some picture stories
on what happened a week or two ago. Ladies Horn e
Journal - you print the personal story of the parttime secretary of Jacqueline K. Onassis (or an article by her preacher on Mamie Eisenhower's personal faith). You got TV, and you run daytime serials
and game shows, and nighttime sit-coms and latenight
talk-shows. So much for the bread and butter. But
that isn't everything. You got to keep looking, break
new ground. So you bring in your best idea-people,
and see what they got. Maybe something good. Maybe
not.
They figure that with the tremendous interest in
the moon shot, what would be better than to televise
a State Banquet for the Astronauts? For the format,
they say, just do what you did before : Put Walter and
Chet and Dave and Frank and Howard K. up there
in the booths, overlooking the thing, and have them
cut away every so often to men on the floor, or to background pieces, and instead of Wally Schirra or somebody you get a fashion consultant, Aline Saarinen
or somebody, to tell you what the women are wearing. You get an advance copy of the menu, which will
be sort of a flight plan for this thing, and as each course
is served you explain to the folks out there in television-land what all those fancy-French words mean,
what the nuts and bolts of the thing is. Don't worry
about things getting too quiet. After all, you got the
kind of President who will order up the Marine Brass
Band to blare out four feet from Caesar Romero and
Wernher von Braun as they pick over the fish course.
And with luck you'll get a little action out front of
the Hotel where you can bet there'll be pickets.
(But it doesn't work. It turns out that a State Dinner isn't anything at all like a launching, that it is,
in fact, a big bore to watch, and tasteless besides. Not
the food, of course; that, we're sure, is as good as it
was cooked up to be. But there 's something spooky
about millions of people watching the First Lady munch
a fillet; something unsettling about watching those
fanfarers march out once again to toot in the President like even Napoleon never got greeted ; something hollow in watching all those Republican fatcats revel in a celebration which by rights belong to
the Democrats who were in power all the while the
moon-mission was being planned; something sickening in watching 2,000 people eat a dinner the arrangeOctober 1969

ments for which cost close to $200,000 when you knew
that a lot of the watchers had empty stomachs. The
thing is, a five minute television news report could
have covered the thing much better, and a photo-story
in a magazine best of all.)
The idea-people figure that if you aren't making
it big any more with photo-journalism (and let's face
it: Life is on the rocks; the August 29 issue carried
only 17 1/2 ad-pages, and Time Inc.'s stock has gone
a-tumbling on the NYSE) maybe what you need is
a little class. So what you do, you get a hot-shot writer
for Life, somebody with real credentials, you know,
like Norman Mailer, and you have him do an endless thing on the Moon-shot. You already got exclusive rights to the Astronaut's own stories (and their
wives' stories, and their children's children's reflections on what it's like to be the grandson of the first
man on the moon) but what they are, they're Astronauts, not writers. So you get a writer to tell you what
it was like. (Go for prose this time; you already tried
James Dickey and his poetry, and that didn't get many
red-hot letters.) So Norman weighs in with 26,000
words on, of course, NORMAN on the MOON, but
this is just the first installment. What a hooker! They'll
be crying out there for more, and you can bet that
Norman will give it to them. Why, it could run forever! MAILER on MARS! JUPITER! and so on. Sure,
it will cost about 400 G's, but he's a big name. Make
your mark with class, and the ads will come rolling
1n.
(But it doesn't work. Mailer and the Moon are not
well-matched. He was good, even great, on political
things; his coverage of the Republican convention
in 1964 was a classic, and his things on the Pentagon
march (Armies of the Night) and on the Chicago convention (Miami and the Siege of Chicago) were brilliant. But he has no place in the space program. He
has come up with a vastly overblown and largely irrelevant account of an epic moment. It's overblown
because Mailer pads the piece with junk about himself when, for once, his presence on the scene helps
not a whit toward understanding what went on; and
it's irrelevant because his nose, trained so well to sniff
out the human dimension, is (as he admits) up against
a scentless quarry. Well, dropping 400 G's on a
bust won't kill Time Inc. But it may diminish Mailer's sizeable reputation.)
Idea-people, you came up with a couple of losers.
First get your media straight; the messages will follow OK.
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The Pilgrim

By 0 . P. KRETZMANN

"A ll the trumbets sounded for him on th e other side"
PILGRIM •s PROGRESS

My Strange Bedfellows
Did any of you recently hear a suspicious "bump"
in the middle of the night? Like something big and
soft hitting the floor?
If you did, it was me getting rid of some strange
bedfellows that had piled in on me. For several months
now I have found myself in partial agreement with
The Chicago Tribune, Christian News, the Lutheran
Free Press, and other such examples of movable type(s).
Last night I woke up screaming and, with one fell
swoop, tossed the lot of them onto the floor . I had
finally had it with them. I want no more slanted journalism, no more half truths, no more oversimplified
answers to complex questions, no more pious neutrality in the midst of great storms.
Of course (before some discerning reader suggests
it), I probably should have kicked myself out of bed
too. My only excuses for not doing so were and are:
a) It is a little hard to do, and
b) I have never pretended to be half true or piously neutral.
I do not know enough to see both sides of things.
Every time I read the "Letters to the Editor" in the
publications mentioned above I get all mixed up - more
so, that is, than usual. "Somebody," I say to myself,
"must be wrong about this matter, but I can't tell who."
And with that admission of defeat - or victory I push them a little closer to the final judgment seat.
That night before I retired again to my restless pillow I remembered the late Westbrook Pegler's famous
remark in similar circumstances. He had said something somewhere which evoked appreciative applause
from the Far Left. In his next column Pegler roared:
"Gimme my pants! I'm in the wrong bed."
I must confess that it is tough for me to carry through
this purge. I have lived with these fellows journalists
of mine so long that I have a certain respect for them.
And, inasmuch as many of them share with me the
washing of Baptism, I look forward to the prospect
of spending eternity in their company. But here her and now - they trouble me. Often I have won-

28

dered what Luther meant when he told Zwingli at
Marburg: "You have another spirit." Is this really
the problem? The mind boggles - a "spirit" which
fits neither time nor eternity! I must turn this over
to the final Judge or go mad.
Perhaps in its nature journalism requires a certain
moral flexibility . I would guess that about 80 per cent
of the "student restlessness" stuff and an almost equal
amount in the church journals of the "Armageddon
syndrome" in the various intra-church quarrels are
creations of the mass media. Armed with a TV camera and microphone, the electronic journalist approaches some second-year seminarian with the honeyed
words: "Just a brief statement for KNUT." There are
other students standing around who have some wise
and thoughtful things to say, but the media boys have
an unerring instinct for the man who walks the earth
with his foot in his mouth. Whereupon, in answer
to the question, our youthful brother says: "We are
reacting against the system that brought us here."
Whereupon the networks, the newspapers, and even
the church journals give the young man nation-wide
coverage.
The whole business leaves me aghast. This young
man is nothing but his old man plus three courses
in Greek. He will make more sense a few years from
now when he has learned that systems are good or
bad, depending on the use to which people put them.
But his "we are rebels against the system" is a sorry
business. Yet his words of wisdom race across the wires
as though they were a new-found Gospel.
The First Amendment allows broad latitude to the
expression of opinion, however wild, however ill-founded. But in these days when so many are appealing
to a higher law, let me claim that right, too. There
is a law, recommended by the Highest Authority,
to which even journalists are bound. It says something
about "speaking the truth in love." I commend it to
the attention of the strange bedfellows who have made
me more than a little ashamed of my profession as
a journalist.
The Cresset

